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Abstract
While global stock markets enjoy high returns on days surrounding FOMC meetings,
there is no comparable result for other central banks either internationally or, more
surprisingly, domestically. Neither announcement surprises nor currency moves drive
these ndings, which hold even for stocks with a domestic focus. The di¤erence in
announcement premia is not explained by economy size, exposure to multinationals,
or policy activism. We conclude that the Fed exerts a unique impact on global equi-
ties. Consistent with this hypothesis, uncertainty drops across global markets following
FOMC announcements but not those of other central banks. Furthermore, the Fed is
generally the leader among central banks in setting monetary policy.
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1. Introduction
Central bank policies have a large impact on securities markets. Equity prices respond
strongly to Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) interest rate decisions (Bernanke
and Kuttner (2005)). Investors also demand a high premium to bear risks associated with
scheduled FOMC announcements: average stock market returns and Sharpe ratios in the
U.S. are 20-40 times higher on days with such announcements relative to non-announcement
days (Savor andWilson (2013); Lucca and Moench (2015)), an e¤ect that is much larger than
for other macroeconomic announcements.1 Furthermore, on FOMC announcement days, the
Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) explains the cross-section of stock returns, with a
strong positive relation between market beta and returns (Savor and Wilson (2014)).2
In this paper, we study how and why announcement risk premia vary globally across
major central banks. We focus our analysis on the Federal Reserve (Fed), the Bank of
England (BoE), the Bank of Japan (BoJ), and the European Central Bank (ECB), but later
also extend it to other central banks. During the 1998-2016 period, these four central banks
were all independent and held regular, scheduled meetings after which they announced their
decisions about current monetary policy, including changes to target interest rates, monetary
aggregates, and planned asset purchases. All four central banks pursued an active monetary
policy over this period, and all four associated free-oating currency zones possess large,
liquid, and active equity markets, both by turnover and market capitalization.
We begin by showing that high equity returns around monetary policy announcements
are a phenomenon that is unique to the Fed. In Figure 1, each panel presents the dif-
ference between average stock market excess returns for the countries associated with our
four major central banks (Germany in the case of the ECB) over a two-day window sur-
1In addition to FOMC announcements, Savor and Wilson (2013) document a positive risk premium in
U.S. equity markets for ination and employment announcements. Jones, Lamont, and Lumsdaine (1998),
Savor and Wilson (2013), Faust and Wright (2009), and Balduzzi and Moneta (2015) nd positive risk premia
in xed income markets for various macroeconomic announcements. Savor and Wilson (2014) and Mueller,
Tahbaz-Salehi, and Vedolin (2017) nd high average returns for di¤erent forms of the carry trade on various
announcement days.
2A number of recent asset pricing papers explore the link between monetary policy and risk premia. See,
for example, Drechsler, Savov, and Schnabl (2018b) and Shaliastovich and Yamarthy (2015).
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rounding the relevant central banks scheduled announcements and average excess returns
on non-announcement days (also over two-day windows for comparison purposes). In the
top left panel, we can see a strong FOMC e¤ect on average excess returns for all four stock
markets, in line with previous work (Lucca and Moench (2015) and Cieslak, Morse, and
Vissing-Jorgensen (2018)). By contrast, as the remaining three panels show, there are no
comparable results for the BoE, BoJ, and ECB. The equity returns on announcement days
for these central banks are similar in magnitude to and not statistically di¤erent from returns
on non-announcement days, which themselves are close to zero. Surprisingly, for the non-
U.S. central banks, there is no announcement premium even in their home market. Investors
in Germany, Japan, and the United Kingdom seem to demand a high premium for risks
associated with FOMC decisions but no premium at all for risks associated with decisions
by those countriesown central banks.
[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE.]
More generally, we nd a strong FOMC e¤ect in almost all international stock markets,
and it is on average similar to that in the U.S. itself. The global average market excess return
is 43.4 bps over a two-day FOMC window compared to 3.3 bps on non-announcement days,
and the di¤erence is positive (and signicant) in 37 (26) out of 38 countries.3 At the same
time, there is virtually no e¤ect for the three other major central banks, whose announce-
ments do not command a risk premium in a large majority of stock markets, including all
major ones.
While it is natural to focus on central banks representing large, globally important
economies, these results hold more broadly. We study announcement premia in eight more
countries covering di¤erent geographic regions and at di¤erent stages of development: Aus-
tralia, Brazil, Canada, Indonesia, Mexico, South Korea, Switzerland, and Turkey. The
3It is not necessarily surprising that, conditional on returns being high in the U.S. on a given day,
returns during the same period are also high in other markets. However, the key distinction between
announcement days and "regular" trading days with high returns is that the former can be identied ex ante.
On announcement days, we can therefore more plausibly identify the origin of the shock: the announcement
itself.
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domestic announcement premium is not statistically signicant in any of these markets, and
is negative more often than it is positive (at the same time, all eight enjoy a high FOMC
announcement premium). There is also no domestic announcement premium during the
1973-1998 period for the Bundesbank, the German central bank widely considered as the
predecessor of the ECB.
We next show that there exists a positive relation between global market beta and stock
returns on FOMC announcement days. This result that the World CAPM captures the
cross-section of global stock returns on announcement days is exclusive to the Fed, as there
is no similar nding for other central banks, further suggesting a unique role for the Fed.
These are puzzling ndings. Given the magnitude and near-universal presence of FOMC
announcement premia, we would expect to see at least a moderate impact for other major
central banks. Furthermore, if central bank announcements (or the signal those announce-
ments o¤er about economic prospects) matter for stock prices, the e¤ect should typically be
the strongest for the domestic central bank.
Before conclusively attributing our results to di¤erent risk premia for FOMC announce-
ments relative to those of other central banks, we need to explore a number of alternative
explanations. One important concern is that during our sample period the Fed on aver-
age delivered good news for equities, so that the high FOMC announcement return reects
news rather than risk premia. Similarly, if other central banks on average delivered negative
news, this could obscure any risk premia associated with their decisions. Contrary to these
hypotheses, our ndings remain the same both in terms of economic magnitudes and statis-
tical signicance when we control for announcement surprises. They also do not change if
we measure returns in local currencies rather than U.S. dollars, showing that exchange rate
movements do not drive the announcement e¤ects we observe (although they do contribute
to the FOMC e¤ect). The results are broad-based and not limited to any particular types
of stocks. Large, small, value, and growth stocks across countries all enjoy a positive and
signicant FOMC premium, while there is no corresponding premium for announcements by
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other central banks.
Combined, our results raise an important question: why is the Fed so important to
global investors compared to other central banks, even those in charge of monetary policy
for comparable economies? We discuss and test a variety of potential answers.
One straightforward possibility is that the domestic economy associated with certain
central banks is too small for its macroeconomic announcements to a¤ect risk premia, even
in their own markets.4 This argument potentially holds for countries such as Switzerland
or even the U.K., whose stock markets contain a large share of multinational rms that are
not overly exposed to the local economy. It is, though, a less plausible hypothesis for a
country like Japan or a whole region like the eurozone. Moreover, when we investigate other
macroeconomic announcements outside the U.S., such as ination and employment, we nd
in most cases a signicant e¤ect on average domestic stock market returns. Based on these
ndings, we conclude that economy size does not explain our results.
Since the U.S. is the largest economy in the world, a related concern is that many multi-
national rms headquartered in other countries have signicant exposure to its economy.
Fed decisions would a¤ect these rms even if they had purely domestic impact. Given that
multinationals represent a major fraction of total market capitalization in most countries,
the global FOMC premium we observe may simply reect the Feds status as the central
bank of the worlds largest economy. However, we nd that the premium exists even for an
index of U.K. rms that are primarily focused on their domestic market, with a magnitude
that is slightly larger than for the overall U.K. stock market. Furthermore, consistent with
our previous ndings, there is no premium associated with Bank of England announcements
for this domestic U.K. index. These results suggest that FOMC announcement premia have
a more complex origin that just direct rm exposure to economic conditions in the U.S.
Even if non-U.S. central banks potentially matter to investors, perhaps they choose not
4Macroeconomic announcements may matter both for the information they provide about the economy
and as a tool to forecast future monetary policies. For example, Gilbert, Scotti, Strasser, and Vega (2017)
develop a measure of the intrinsic value of a U.S. macroeconomic announcement, which is based on its ability
to predict GDP growth, ination, and the Federal Funds Rate.
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to pursue an active monetary policy (or at least have not done so in the past), thereby
greatly reducing investor uncertainty regarding their decisions. Contrary to this hypothesis,
in the period we study all three major central banks outside the U.S. at times exhibit an
avowedly activist policy, with large variations in interest rates as well as use of unconventional
monetary policy tools. A related explanation is that these central banks actually pursue
an active policy, but that their decisions are widely anticipated in advance, whether by
design or inadvertently. In this scenario, there is little scope for the markets to be surprised
by information released through scheduled announcements. To address this conjecture, we
study futures-implied interest-rate changes for the euro, yen, and sterling. We nd that ECB,
BoJ, and BoE announcement days are all associated with much larger absolute changes in
domestic interest-rate expectations than non-announcement days, which is consistent with
the hypothesis that these central banks at least occasionally surprise investors. Consequently,
central bankslevel of activism or policy predictability likely do not account for the di¤erence
in announcement premia between the Fed and other central banks.
Finally, after ruling out economy size, exposure to U.S. economic conditions, and observ-
able central bank policies as explanations for our results, we propose that the Fed may simply
be unique among the worlds central banks. One explanation for why the Fed is special is
that it is the "worlds central bank," whose policies have greater impact and wider reach than
those of other central banks. Supporting this hypothesis, we show that implied volatility
decreases across global equity markets following FOMC announcements, whereas for other
central banks the e¤ect exists only in their domestic market (crucially, these results hold
controlling for announcement returns).5 This result suggests that FOMC announcements
provide new information (about future monetary policy, the Feds policy function, and/or
economic prospects) that is relevant to equity prices on a global scale, while the impact of
other central banks is limited to their home market.6
5More broadly, Dew-Becker, Giglio, and Kelly (2017) detect strong linkages between realized and implied
volatility in 19 markets and macroeconomic uncertainty.
6We also nd that the the commonly assumed negative relation between equity returns and surprise
interest rate cuts holds only for the Fed, in whose case the relation exists worldwide.
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The Feds ability to a¤ect global developments may have its origin in the Feds role
as the leader in terms of setting monetary policy. In this case, its announcements would
provide information about the direction of monetary policy not only for the U.S. but also
worldwide, and therefore command a higher risk premium than announcements by other
central banks. We show that FOMC announcements are associated with higher volatility of
interest-rate expectations in Japan and the eurozone, while there is no such relation between
announcements by other central banks and U.S. interest-rate expectations. This evidence is
suggestive of a leading role for the Fed among central banks. The role extends beyond just
setting interest rates, as we provide a number of examples of various central banks following
the Feds lead in other aspects of central bank operations.7
Overall, our results are consistent with the hypothesis that the Feds actions have a
greater and broader impact because of its special role in the global nancial system. This
hypothesis also ts with recent work on global nancial cycles in capital ows, asset prices,
and credit growth, which argues that one of the major determinants of these cycles is U.S.
monetary policy (Rey (2013)).8
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our data and method-
ology. Section 3 presents our results on the risk premia associated with di¤erent central
banksannouncements across global stock markets. Section 4 studies announcement returns
in greater detail. Section 5 explores possible explanations for why announcement premia are
high for the Fed but not for other major central banks. Section 6 concludes and discusses
directions for further research. Details about data sources, time and date alignment across
time zones, the World CAPM, and FOMC premia over an extended sample period and for
7There exist a number of other potential reasons for why the Fed is unique, including the degree to
which global conditions inuence its policies, its capabilities and data sources (Cieslak, Morse, and Vissing-
Jorgensen (2018)), and its responsiveness to stock market developments (Cieslak and Vissing-Jorgensen
(2017)). These reasons are not mutually exclusive and are potentially complementary, both with each other
and with the Feds leader role among central banks.
8Miranda-Agrippino and Rey (2018) and Bruno and Shin (2015) document that U.S. monetary policy
a¤ects the balance sheets of systemically important nancial intermediaries, global credit growth and spreads,
and cross-border credit ows. Drechsler, Savov, and Schnabl (2018a) provide a review of the literature on
the transmission of monetary policy through the nancial system.
6
global banks are available in the Online Appendix.
2. Data and methodology
The focus of our paper is on global equity returns associated with central bank announce-
ments on monetary policy. Our tests cover stock markets in 38 countries, which are assigned
into four groups: Europe (17 countries), North America (2 countries), Asia-Pacic (5 coun-
tries), and Emerging (14 countries). We obtain daily total equity return series (denominated
in U.S. dollars or domestic currency) from Datastream Global Equity Indices, with coverage
starting in January 1973 for those countries with the longest available time series and ending
in December 2016. Individual stock returns for the U.S. are from the Center for Research
in Security Prices and for Germany, Japan, and the U.K. from Worldscope. Daily risk-free
rates come from Professor Kenneth Frenchs website. Since we typically measure returns in
U.S. dollars, we use the U.S. risk-free rate in computing excess returns (using local risk-free
rates produces the same results for all tests).
2.1. U.S. announcements
We collect the dates of scheduled FOMCmeetings directly from the Federal Reserve, with
coverage starting in 1978. Before February 1994, we assume the FOMC decision became
public one day after its meeting (as in Kuttner (2001)). Starting in February 1994, the
FOMC would reveal its decision to investors through a prescheduled statement released
in the afternoon of the day the meeting ended. Before April 2011, the release time was
2:15pm, and since then it varied between 12:30pm and 2pm.9 We exclude any unscheduled
announcements from our sample.
An important issue is to establish which trading day, the same day or the following day, is
the rst day on which investors in a particular market can respond to a U.S. announcement.
To do this, we collect data on time di¤erences relative to the U.S. and on market-open hours
9Since April 2011, the Fed holds a press conference after half of FOMC meetings. Boguth, Gregoire, and
Martineau (2017) show that investors expect important policy changes to occur during meetings with press
conferences, and consequently pay more attention to such meetings.
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for each of the 38 countries in our sample. Because local clocks lose or gain time at various
dates in the year (as in, for example, daylight savings time in the U.S.) and because these
timing conventions have changed at various points in our sample period, this is not a trivial
task. Table A.1 in the Online Appendix reports which day (the same or next day) represents
the e¤ective announcement day for all international stock markets in our sample, as well as
information on time di¤erences and market hours.
In our tests, we focus on two-day cumulative returns. Our announcement return window
includes the rst trading day when investors in a given market can react to an announce-
ment as well as the preceding trading day. For example, for a post-February 1994 FOMC
announcement in the U.S., the U.S. return window includes the day on which the announce-
ment occurred and the immediately preceding trading day. For an Asian stock market, which
is closed by the time the FOMC releases its decision, the return window includes the FOMC
announcement day and the next trading day (since these markets can only then react to the
announcement). Panel I of Table A.2 in the Online Appendix provides more details on how
we construct return windows for markets across di¤erent geographies.
We use a two-day window for two reasons. First, it ensures we do not exclude the
"correct" announcement day from our window (European markets, which are open for part
of the U.S. trading day, are potentially problematic, especially after March 2011 when the
exact FOMC announcement timing varied) and facilitates easier comparisons across markets
in di¤erent time zones. Second, Lucca and Moench (2015) identify an upward drift in the
U.S. stock market in a 24-hour window before the scheduled FOMC release time, a result
they claim is inconsistent with risk-based explanations. However, it is also possible that some
investors occasionally receive signals about the content of FOMC statements before the actual
announcement. Cieslak, Morse, and Vissing-Jorgensen (2018) provide a number of examples
of current and former Fed insiders selectively communicating with market participants, as
well as more systematic evidence consistent with leaks. In addition to a number of past
investigations, there is also an investigation in progress of a potential Fed leak in 2012
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that resulted in the recent resignation of Je¤rey Lacker, the president of the Federal Reserve
Bank of Richmond. Bernile, Hu, and Tang (2016) nd evidence that is suggestive of informed
trading during FOMC news embargoes.
If FOMC decisions sometimes leak out before they are announced, this would a¤ect the
exact timing of any risk premiums realization. For example, Ai and Bansal (2018) develop a
revealed preference theory for the macroeconomic announcement premium (Savor andWilson
(2013)), and show that in the presence of potential information leakage we would observe
a pre-announcement positive drift that depends on the risk associated with the a¤ected
announcement. In other words, if the content of an announcement is sometimes observed
before the actual announcement, the risk premium would also be partially realized before
the announcement. Since our paper is primarily about the absolute and relative size of the
announcement premium for di¤erent central banks in global stock markets, and not about
whether some agents observe information early, we use a two-day window and so can remain
agnostic about the exact timing of the actual release of news.10
We dene non-announcement days for all stock markets in our sample as those trading
days on which there are no scheduled announcements by the Fed, BoE, BoJ, or ECB.We com-
pute non-announcement-day returns in an analogous way to our approach for announcement-
day returns: we cumulate pairs of returns on consecutive non-announcement days. We do
this so we can directly compare returns on announcement- and non-announcement days.
As an exception, we use three-day windows to account for any "lone" non-announcement
day preceding a two a-day return. This procedure is conservative: increasing the horizon
for non-announcement-day returns relative to announcement-day returns will understate the
announcement premium (the average return di¤erence between two types of days).
Henceforth, we refer to announcement days as a-days (which are really two a-days) and
non-announcement days as n-days (which are really two n-days). We dene the announce-
ment premium as the di¤erence between average excess returns on a particular set of an-
10Savor and Wilson (2016) deal with a similar issue about the exact timing of corporate earnings an-
nouncements by using one-week windows.
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nouncement days (which will be di¤erent for di¤erent announcements) and the average excess
returns on non-announcement days (which will always be the same, except for di¤erent sam-
ple coverage).
The dates of U.S. employment and ination announcements come from the Bureau of
Labor Statistics, with coverage starting in 1958. These announcements occur each month,
and are released before the stock market opens in the U.S., typically at 8:30am EST.
2.2. International announcements
We focus our analysis of central banks outside the U.S. on three major central banks: the
Bank of England (BoE), the Bank of Japan (BoJ), and the European Central Bank (ECB).
By any measure, these three are among the worlds most important central banks and are very
probably the top three after the Federal Reserve (at least until Chinas recent emergence).
The three central banks have four key common characteristics: they manage interest rates in
economies with a oating exchange rate regime; they have independent mandates (politicians
cannot directly order them to adopt certain policies, and their senior sta¤ cannot easily be
replaced by politicians); these mandates are clearly dened (for example, price stability in
the eurozone or the dual mandate for the Federal Reserve) and almost certainly generally
understood by market participants (even though they may disagree about what exactly is
meant by these mandates in practice); and they hold regular scheduled meetings to decide
policies and reach conclusions about the economy whose outcomes are communicated to the
public according to a timetable that is published in advance.
Even though it is now accepted as a given, these banks have only recently been granted
their independence. The BoE gained independent control of interest rates in June 1997, and
the BoJ attained full independence with control of interest rates in April 1998. The ECB
was independent from its inception, but it was only established in June 1998 and started
exercising its full powers in January 1999. Since the empirical approach we adopt requires
scheduled announcements of monetary policy decisions, our primary sample covers the 1998-
2016 period (1999-2016 for the ECB). Although not very long, this period includes many
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notable nancial events, such as the Asian crisis, the LTCM-Russia crisis, the internet boom
and bust, the global nancial crisis of 2008-2009, and the eurozone crisis.
We collect data on the scheduled announcements of these central banks, typically from
their websites or printed publications. Table A.3 in the Online Appendix lists the exact
sources for our data and the method of collecting it, together with information on the central
banksstatus. This table also details the release dates and data sources for these countries
(or currency zones) other macroeconomic releases, namely employment and ination, which
we obtain from the relevant countriesnational statistics agencies.11 As in the U.S., these
monthly macroeconomic announcements are released before the market opens: at 8am in
Germany, 8.30am in Japan, and 8.30 or 9.30am in the U.K.
For most of our sample period, all three central banks held scheduled meetings more
frequently than the Fed, so that over a comparable period we have more observations for
these banks. Recently, though, they adopted the Fed approach with eight scheduled meet-
ings per year, which was the culmination of a longer-term trend of reducing the number of
scheduled meetings. The ECB initially met twice per month to assess monetary policy, then
in November 2001 moved to one monthly meeting, and nally in January 2015 adopted a
six-week monetary policy cycle. The ECB announces its monetary policy decisions through
a press release at 1:45pm Central European time on the day of its meeting.
Between 1998 and 2005, the BoJ progressively reduced the number of monetary policy
meetings from 20 to 15 per year, and then settled on 14 in 2006. In 2016, the BoJ further
reduced the number of meetings to eight, in line with other major central banks. Since
inception, BoJ monetary policy announcements are released immediately after each policy
meeting. In the early years, the timing of the release was highly volatile, ranging from
10am to 6pm, as documented in the BoJ minutes. In order to provide su¢ cient time for
deliberation and to enable nancial markets to digest its decisions in a timely manner, the
BoJ introduced two-day meetings in April 2001, with the expectation that its decisions will
11Surprisingly, sometimes this data is hard to obtain, requiring freedom of information requests or access
to hard copies of reports.
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be made public by 3pm of the second meeting day.
The BoE held one monthly meeting from its independence until October 2016 (with the
exception of 2008, when one scheduled meeting was replaced by an unscheduled one), when
it also adopted an eight-meeting schedule. Since independence, interest rate decisions are
announced at noon on the second day of the meeting.
As with the Fed, when classifying trading days as announcement or non-announcement
days, we account for time di¤erences and market-open hours across countries, and exclude
any unscheduled announcements from the sample.12 Generally, other central banks do not
schedule their policy announcements to coincide with those of the Fed. Out of 152 scheduled
FOMC announcements since 1998, none occur on the same day as BoE or ECB announce-
ments and 15 occur on the same day as BoJ announcements. All the results in the paper
remain the same if we exclude these 15 BoJ announcements from our sample.
We also collect data for eight additional central banks that held or introduced regular
scheduled meetings during our sample period: the Swiss National Bank (starting in January
2000), the Bank of Canada (December 2000), the Reserve Bank of Australia (January 1998),
the Bank Sentral Republik Indonesia (July 2005), Banco de Mexico (January 2003), Banco
Central do Brazil (January 1998), the South African Reserve Bank (October 1999), and the
Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey (January 2005). The countries represented by these
central banks all have economies and stock markets of at least meaningful size by global
standards, and they cover di¤erent geographical regions and range from very developed to
fully emerging. Details about the frequency and timing of their meetings come from their
websites or freedom of information requests, and are summarized in Table A.4 in the Online
Appendix.13
Finally, we obtain the dates of scheduled announcements for the Bundesbank, the German
central bank that has a history of rm independence from the government and is considered
12Panel II of Table A.2. in the Online Appendix denes the announcement windows for these three central
banks.
13Panel III of Table A.2. in the Online Appendix denes the announcement windows for these eight
central banks.
12
by most to be the direct predecessor of the ECB. Between 1958 and 1998, the Bundesbanks
monetary policy meetings took place every two weeks in the morning, and it announced its
decisions either in the afternoon of the meeting day or the next morning.
3. Central bank announcements and global stock markets
In this section we examine how central bank announcements a¤ect stock market risk
premia for the 38 countries in our sample. We start by presenting and discussing the results
for FOMC announcements. Next we cover ndings for the other three major central banks,
and then show our analysis for eight additional central banks. We further conrm our
principal results in an extended sample for the Fed and the Bundesbank. Finally, we explore
the cross-section of returns on announcement days.
Table 1 reports the mean announcement-day excess return and the di¤erence between
mean announcement- and non-announcement-day excess returns (announcement premium)
for the Fed, BoE, BoJ, and ECB. t-statistics are reported in brackets. Countries are grouped
into four geographical areas: Europe in Panel A, North America in Panel B, developed Asia-
Pacic in Panel C, and Emerging in Panel D.
3.1. Federal Reserve
Column I of Panel B shows that the FOMC a-day average excess return in the U.S. is 48.4
bps, which is 46.9 bps higher than on non-announcement days and represents a statistically
signicantly di¤erence, with a t-statistic of 3.32. This result replicates the nding in Savor
and Wilson (2013) and Lucca and Moench (2015) that FOMC days command a positive
premium. The n-day average excess return is low at only 1.5 bps (for a two-day cumulative
return) and not statistically di¤erent from zero, indicating that the bulk of the 1998-2016
U.S. equity premium was earned on FOMC a-days.14 Return volatility is very similar on
FOMC days and on n-days (the di¤erence, though statistically signicant, is economically
14The cumulative excess return for eight FOMC announcements equals 3.87% in an average year, compared
to 1.26% for non-announcement days, of which there are roughly 170 (the rest are a-days of other central
banks).
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marginal). Consequently, Sharpe ratios are much greater on FOMC days, 3.27 in annualized
terms, than on n-days, 0.1 annualized.
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE.]
Turning next to the rest of the world, the pattern we document is of widespread FOMC
premia, with almost all countries exhibiting much higher average excess returns on FOMC
days than on n-days.15 The di¤erence is statistically signicant for 26 countries, spanning
all geographical regions. Apart from three exceptions (Chile, China, and Venezuela), the
magnitudes of the premia are economically large, typically ranging between 30 and 60 bps.
These ndings are consistent with those in Lucca and Moench (2015), who document a
positive market return before FOMC announcements in the U.S., Canada, and ve European
countries (though not in Japan), and Cieslak, Morse, and Vissing-Jorgensen (2018), who
show that both the developed and emerging market indices earn high returns in even weeks
starting with the last FOMC meeting.
On n-days average excess returns are negligible: not a single country has positive n-day
average excess returns that are statistically signicant. As in the U.S., return volatility is
typically similar on FOMC and n-days, meaning that FOMC-day Sharpe ratios are again
orders of magnitude higher, with numbers that are roughly equal to the ones given in the
above paragraph for the U.S.
The global market portfolio, constructed from the 38 stock markets weighted by their
lagged total market capitalization, enjoys an average excess return of 44.9 bps on FOMC a-
days, with a t-statistic of 3.37 (43.4 bps for the equal-weighted global market portfolio). This
is extraordinarily high and close in magnitude to the level in the U.S., suggesting investors
in other countries demand a similar risk premium for exposure to FOMC decisions as do
U.S. investors. Our estimates imply that even outside the U.S. a highly disproportionate
share of total market returns occurs on FOMC days.
15Table C.1 in the Online Appendix shows that in Europe the rst day accounts for a greater fraction of
the two-day announcement excess return, while in the rest of the world the second day is more important.
In a large majority of countries (30), both days contribute to the announcement premium.
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Of course, conditional on knowing that market returns over a given period are high in
the U.S., it is not surprising that they are also high in other markets. However, on a typical
day it is hard to identify the origin of the shocks - did a shock in the U.S. spill over to
Germany or vice versa? On announcement days, which occur on a regular schedule set
month in advance, it is at least plausible to argue that the announcement itself caused the
price move.16 Thus, while not unexpected given the existence of the FOMC premium in the
U.S., these results show that FOMC announcements are a leading driver of stock market
returns in every important and investible stock market in the world.
3.2. Major non-U.S. central banks
The remaining columns in Table 1 present announcement premia for the other three
major central banks. In strong contrast to FOMC announcements, average excess returns
are not signicantly higher on BoE, BoJ, and ECB a-days in a large majority of markets.
The BoE announcement premium is not statistically signicant anywhere in the world, and
its point estimate is actually negative in a substantial majority of countries. Most notably,
U.K. stock market average excess returns on BoE a-days are lower than on n-days. Even
investors in the U.K. market do not seem to demand a premium to bear risks associated
with BoE scheduled announcements.
The BoJ announcement premium is positive and signicant in only three out of 38 mar-
kets, and the number drops to one once we control for announcement surprises (see section
below). In Japan itself, the premium is low at 5.2 bps (t-statistic = 0.37). The ECB pre-
mium is signicant in ve countries, all of which are not in Europe itself. Of the eurozone
countries, the premium is actually negative in France (-4.1 bps), Germany (-0.7 bps), and
the Netherlands (-1.5 bps), and is economically negligible everywhere else except Belgium
(18.7 bps) and Finland (27.5 bps), where it is still far from statistically signicant.17
16Consistent with this view, Albuquerque and Vega (2009) nd that U.S. public information has an e¤ect
on stock returns in Portugal, while cross-country market return co-movement does not change around the
release of U.S. macroeconomic news.
17Schmeling and Wagner (2017) and Ulrich, Jakobs, May, and Landwehr (2017) document a positive
drift before ECB announcements for the Euro Stoxx 50 index, which is followed by a full reversal after the
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Aggregating across markets, the announcement premium of the global market portfolio is
not statistically signicant for any of the three central banks. It is also always signicantly
lower than the portfolios FOMC announcement premium: the di¤erence is 51.6 bps (t-
statistic = 3.10) for the BoE, 37.1 bps (t-statistic = 2.31) for the BoJ, and 36.7 (t-statistic
= 2.16) for the ECB. Together, the results in this section document an important and
potentially puzzling nding: not only do risk premia associated with FOMC announcements
dwarf those associated with announcements by major non-U.S. central banks across global
markets, they even do so in the non-U.S. bankshome markets.18 In terms of equity risk
premia associated with central banksannouncements, the Fed is the only game in town.
As noted previously, during almost the entire period we study the BoE, BoJ, and ECB
held policy meetings more frequently than the Fed. More scheduled announcements over a
given period potentially diminishes the importance of any single one, which would result in
lower announcement risk premia. However, even when we take this e¤ect into account (by
scaling returns by the inverse of the number of announcements per year), the magnitude
of FOMC premia greatly exceeds the premia for other central banks, indicating that the
di¤erent number of announcements does not explain our ndings.
3.3. Additional central banks
Our analysis above focused on four central banks representing large, developed economies,
which account for a major fraction of global GDP and stock market capitalization (espe-
cially before Chinas recent rapid growth). As such, these four represent obvious targets
of special interest for our study. To conrm our results are not limited to a particular set
of central banks sharing similar characteristics, we explore here announcement premia for
central banks in eight more countries: Australia, Brazil, Canada, Indonesia, Mexico, South
Korea, Switzerland, and Turkey. We choose this set based on two criteria: 1) countries with
announcement. This drift is largely driven by the Euro-crisis period (2010-12), as shown by Ulrich, Jakobs,
May, and Landwehr (2017). Over our sample period, domestic market returns are not statistically signicant
either on the day before or the day of the ECB announcement (see Figure C.1 in the Online Appendix).
18When we split the announcement window into its two constituent days in Table C.1 in the Online
Appendix, these results also hold separately on each day.
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reasonably sizeable economies and stock markets; and 2) countries in di¤erent geographical
regions and at di¤erent stages of economic development.
Figure 2 presents the announcement premia in their home market for the eight central
banks in U.S. dollar (USD) and local-currency terms. To distinguish our ndings from those
for the four major central banks, we exclude from our analysis any announcements that
overlap with those of the Fed, BoE, BoJ, or ECB.19 The key take-away is that none of the
eight countries enjoy a statistically signicant domestic announcement premium either in
USD or local currency. The premium in USD is actually negative in ve countries. It is
relatively high in Brazil at 37.3 bps (t-statistic = 1.22), but this result seems to be driven by
global market movements, as the average a-day return for the world market portfolio is 30.3
bps. The announcement premia are similar expressed in local currency, with four positive
and four negative estimates, none of which are close to being statistically signicant. These
ndings provide further support for the conclusion that the Fed is special among global
central banks in how its announcements a¤ect equity risk premia worldwide.
[FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE.]
3.4. Extended sample
As our next step, we establish the robustness of our ndings by studying announcement
premia in two additional samples: i) for the FOMC over a longer 1978-2016 period; and ii)
for the Bundesbank before it was incorporated into the ECB.
The Fed has a longer history of operational independence than the other three major
central banks, allowing us to signicantly expand the sample period for FOMC announce-
ments relative to our main 1998-2016 one.20 Over the 1978-2016 period, the FOMC premium
in the U.S. remains high, both in terms of economic magnitude (31.2 bps) and statistical
signicance (t-statistic = 3.70). Similar to the results for our primary sample, this premium
19All results stay the same if we include such observations in our sample.
20Fed independence is typically dated to 1977, when the Congress specied its current objective of max-
imum employment and price stability, and 1978, when the Congress exempted monetary policy operations
from reviews by the Government Accountability O¢ ce.
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is present in most stock global markets. It is 25.5 bps (t-statistic = 2.41) in Germany, 27.2
bps (t-statistic = 2.43) in Japan, and 31.5 bps (t-statistic = 2.91) in the U.K. Overall, out of
38 markets, the FOMC announcement premium is positive in 37 and statistically signicant
in 29, conrming this is not a phenomenon that exists only since 1998.21
The Fed is not the only major central bank with long-standing independence. The
German Bundesbank, which is currently part of the ECB, enjoyed independence almost
from its inception and was generally regarded as the second most inuential central bank
in the world for most of its history. Still, the Bundesbank announcement premium in the
German stock market over the 1973-1998 period is only 6.3 bps, which is not statistically
signicant (t-statistic = 0.96) and is much lower than the corresponding FOMC premium.
3.5. World CAPM on central bank announcement days
Savor andWilson (2014) show that the CAPM prices U.S. stocks on FOMC, ination, and
employment announcement days, while it fails to do soon non-announcement days.22 Other
authors examine whether an international version of the CAPM prices stocks globally (see
Brusa, Ramadorai, and Verdelhan (2015) and references therein), with most of the evidence
suggesting that it fails even more than the U.S.-only version. We study the performance of
the global CAPM ("World CAPM") on central bank announcement days, and show that on
FOMC days it prices the cross-section of global stock returns. More specically, on days of
FOMC announcements the slope of the security market line is positive and very close to the
realized average excess return of the world market portfolio; the R2 of the cross-sectional
regression is high; and the intercept is not statistically signicant. None of these results hold
on announcement days of other central banks, providing further evidence that the Fed is
unique and di¤erent from other central banks in its impact on equity markets. The details
of our empirical approach and ndings are given in Section B of the Online Appendix.
21Table C.2 in the Online Appendix provides the details.
22Using a similar approach, Hendershott, Livdan, and Rösch (2018) nd that the CAPM holds overnight
both in the U.S. and internationally.
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4. Dissecting announcement returns
High FOMC announcement returns in global stock markets are consistent with the hy-
pothesis that investors demand a risk premium for exposure to Fed decisions. Similarly, the
much lower announcement returns for other central banks are consistent with the hypothesis
that there is no risk premium for exposure to their decisions. However, these are not the
only possible interpretations. We therefore next explore whether announcement surprises,
currency movements, and stock-market composition explain our results on announcement
returns across di¤erent central banks.
4.1. Central bank announcement surprises
A simple explanation for why market returns are high on FOMC a-days is that over our
sample period the Fed on average positively surprised equity investors. For example, during
this period market participants and commentators often discussed the "Greenspan put" or
the "Bernanke put," referencing a belief that the Fed will step in to support the market if a
downturn occurred. Under this explanation, high returns on FOMC days do not reect any
risk premia investors require to bear risks associated with FOMC announcements but rather
reect good news coming from the Fed. Applying the same logic, it is also possible that the
risk premium for other central banksdecisions is actually positive, but that these banks on
average disappointed equity investors, thus obscuring the positive announcement premium.
To address these hypotheses, we need to control for the content of news released through
central bank announcements. We do so by including the monetary policy surprise in our
analysis and estimating the following OLS regression:
retit = + D
a
t + r
u
t + "t; (1)
where retit is the excess market return in country i on day t, D
a
t is a dummy variable for
a-days associated with a given central bank, and rut is the unexpected target rate change
for that central bank, our measure of monetary policy surprise.
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Bernanke and Kuttner (2005) show that U.S. stock prices increase in response to surprise
FOMC interest rate cuts. Similar to that paper, we measure the FOMC monetary policy
surprise by using Federal Funds Futures, a nancial product tied to the Fed funds rate that
investors use to speculate on or hedge the actual FOMC interest rate announcements. More
specically, we dene this surprise as the unexpected target rate change, rut , computed as:
rut =
K
K   t
 
f 0m;t   f 0m;t 1

; (2)
where f 0m;t is the 30-day Federal Funds Futures rate, K is the number of days in the current
month, and t is the current day of the month.23
Unfortunately, in the sterling, yen, and euro currency zones there are no equivalent
exchange-traded interest rate futures to the Federal Funds Futures. However, all three cur-
rency zones have an active interbank lending market, with their own versions of the London
Interbank O¤ered Rate (Libor), the average of interbank lending rate quotes. Futures con-
tracts on Euro Interbank O¤ered Rate (Euribor), Euroyen Tokyo Interbank O¤ered Rate
(Euroyen Tibor), and Sterling London Interbank O¤ered Rate (Sterling Libor) are all traded
on large and liquid exchanges in London or Chicago. Because these interbank rates are typ-
ically set with reference to central bank rates, we assume that central bank announcement
surprises are reected in the futures-implied rates. Therefore, we use the change in the rates
implied by interest rate futures prices as our proxy for surprises associated with announce-
ments by a particular central bank.
We collect 3-month Euribor, Euroyen Tibor, and Sterling Libor futures prices. (Although
1-month futures contracts exist, they have much lower volume and open interest.) We then
create a continuous time series of implied rate changes that is based on the nearest-to-
maturity contract. For example, for an announcement in June, we rst use the 3-month
futures contract expiring in March up to its expiration date, and then switch to the 3-month
23As in Kuttner (2001), we use the unscaled change in the Federal Funds Futures rate for the last three
days of the month, and we use the next months contract for rate changes occurring on the rst day of the
month.
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contract expiring in June.
In Table 2, we estimate the regression specication given by Eq. (1) for the four major
central banks. The coe¢ cient of most interest is , which measures the a-day premium
controlling for the monetary policy surprise associated with a particular central banks an-
nouncements. For the Fed, this coe¢ cient is positive in 35 out of 38 countries, and it is
statistically signicant in 23 countries. The  magnitude is similar to the FOMC premia
documented in Table 1, suggesting that our ndings are not driven by FOMC interest-rate
surprises. The point estimates are generally slightly lower than without controls for an-
nouncement surprises, consistent with the downward trend in U.S. interest rates over our
sample period, but the magnitude of the e¤ect is small.
Feds  coe¢ cient, measuring the market response to interest rate rate surprises, is nega-
tive (and statistically signicant) in all (31) countries, a result consistent with the hypothesis
that markets respond positively to surprise FOMC rate cuts and in line with the ndings in
Bernanke and Kuttner (2005). This latter result also reassures us that the surprise measure
we employ captures FOMC news that is relevant to investors.
Starting with the last quarter of 2008, the Fed provided advance guidance to market
participants that its target rate would stay close to zero for the foreseeable future, so that
there were no target rate surprises in most of the post-2008 period (the rst change occurred
in December 2015). This does not mean that FOMC announcements were irrelevant to in-
vestors in this period, as FOMC statements revealed important information such as guidance
about the path of interest rates or about the Feds unconventional monetary policy tools.
It does mean, though, that our measure of monetary policy surprises is less relevant in this
period. However, all the results we describe in this section continue to hold if we end our
analysis in 2008 rather than in 2016.
[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE.]
The  coe¢ cient is never statistically signicant for the BoE, is only signicant in New
Zealand for the BoJ, and is (marginally) signicant in four non-European markets (Hong
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Kong, Indonesia, Philippines, and Turkey) for the ECB. Furthermore, its sign is negative
as often as it is positive. Thus, we conclude that our results on the absence of risk premia
associated with BoE, BoJ, and ECB announcements are robust to controls for monetary
policy surprises.
Interestingly, the  coe¢ cient is often positive and signicant (and never negative and
signicant) for the major non-U.S. central banks. The results suggest that equity markets
respond negatively to surprise interest rate cuts by the three central banks, especially the
ECB, which is a puzzling nding.24 Potential explanations include these banks playing a
di¤erent role than the Fed, their surprise rate cuts representing a negative signal about
economic prospects, the fact that we measure returns in USDs rather than local currencies,
or issues with our surprise measure derived from interbank futures. Given this question is
not the focus of our paper, we leave it for future research.
4.2. Local vs. USD returns
Our tests so far measure returns in USDs. For non-U.S. markets, the USD return will
reect two components: the local-currency return and the exchange rate change. In Table 3,
we examine how much our results above are inuenced by currency movements. Each of the
four panels presents announcement premia for a particular central bank in local-currency
terms, as well as the di¤erence between announcement premia measured in USD and the
local currency.
[TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE.]
The rst panel shows that the FOMC a-day premium also exists when returns are mea-
sured in the local currency, with a positive (and statistically signicant) premium in 36 (25)
out of 38 countries. Interestingly, for 34 out of 37 countries (in the U.S., there is by denition
no currency e¤ect), market returns are higher in USD terms, suggesting their currencies tend
to appreciate against the dollar on FOMC a-days.25 These results indicate that currency
24Schmeling and Wagner (2017) show that equity prices respond to the tone of ECB communications.
25These results are consistent with those in Savor and Wilson (2014) and Mueller, Tahbaz-Salehi, and
Vedolin (2017).
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movements contribute to the FOMC e¤ect we document above, but that the bulk of the
e¤ect stems from underlying changes in equity prices.
The remaining three panels present the same analysis for the other three central banks.
The general point is that the nding that there is no announcement premium for the BoE,
BoJ, and ECB continues to hold when returns are measured in local currencies. Similarly,
there is no consistent currency e¤ect for these other central banksannouncements, with
currencies depreciating as often as appreciating relative to the USD on a-days. We conclude
that the Feds unique impact extends to currency movements, but that these movements do
not account for the majority of its stock market e¤ect.
4.3. Characteristics-sorted portfolios
Our analysis above focused on aggregate market portfolios. A large literature (for a recent
overview see McLean and Ponti¤ (2016)) nds that various stock characteristics predict the
cross-section of stock returns, at least in-sample. A question then arises whether our results
for the aggregate market are driven by a subset of stocks with certain characteristics. To
address this issue, we study portfolios based on rm size and valuation, two of the best-
known and established predictors of stock returns (Fama and French (1992) and Fama and
French (1993)). We restrict our analysis to four major markets: the U.S., the U.K., Japan,
and Germany, each representing one of the central banks covered in our analysis. We use
four MSCI Style Indices: Large Cap, Small Cap, Value, and Growth.
Table 4 shows that in all four countries each of the four portfolios enjoys a positive and
statistically signicant FOMC announcement premium, while none of the four portfolios
exhibits a signicant domestic announcement premium. Furthermore, the FOMC premia
are similar in magnitude both across and within countries. These ndings suggest that the
FOMC premium is a widespread phenomenon not limited to certain types of stocks.
[TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE.]
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5. Origins of FOMC premia
In the previous sections we establish that equity risk premia are high on FOMC announce-
ment days in almost all global stock markets, with no similar relation for announcements
by other central banks. We also show that announcement surprises, currency movements,
or choice of sample period and set of central banks do not explain these results. We now
explore and discuss potential origins of FOMC announcement premia.
5.1. Central banks as proxies for economies: employment and ination announcements
One straightforward potential explanation for the simultaneous presence of a high FOMC
announcement premium and the absence of such a premium for other central banks is that, in
contrast to the Fed, they do not matter to diversied equity investors because the economies
they represent are not systematically important. For example, it would not be surprising
if Croatian stocks do not exhibit elevated risk premia in response to Croatian ination
(or central bank) announcements, as the idiosyncratic component of Croatian ination is
very likely completely diversiable to international investors holding Croatian stocks. This,
though, is much less likely for holders of German, Japanese, or U.K. stocks, since the three
economies are large by any global standard.
To address this size issue more formally, we study employment and ination announce-
ments in the U.S., U.K., Japan, and Germany. Both of these represent major macroeconomic
news that can thus be associated with risk premia (see Savor and Wilson (2013)). Table
5 reports a-day average excess returns and their di¤erence relative to n-day average ex-
cess returns (announcement premium) for each of the four stock markets, broken down by
announcement type. We focus on the impact of announcements in their domestic markets.
[TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE.]
For the U.S., we estimate a positive premium of 2.9 bps for employment announcements
and one of 5.5 bps for ination announcements, but neither of these are statistically signi-
cant. This is consistent with the discussion in Savor and Wilson (2014) that notes the fading
away of risk premia associated with ination and especially employment in the U.S., and the
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gradual increase in the FOMC premium.26
In the U.K., we nd positive employment and ination announcement premia of 9.7 and
10.9 bps, respectively. These are economically meaningful numbers, though only ination
is statistically signicant. For Japan, the risk premium for employment announcements
is positive at 7.1 bps but not signicant, while the ination premium is strongly positive
and signicant (12.1 bps, with a t-statistic of 2.18). Turning to Germany, its stock market
enjoys excess returns that are on average 14.7 bps higher (t-statistic = 2.36) on German
employment a-days compared to n-days, and 10.4 bps higher (t-statistic = 1.81) on German
ination days.27
Taken together, the ndings here provide support for the hypothesis that the economic
news in the U.K., Japan, and Germany is systematically important to global investors, and
that consequently investors demand a risk premium for exposure to this news. This is an
intuitive and not overly surprising result. However, it makes our previous ndings on non-
U.S. central banks even more puzzling, suggesting that the explanation for why investors
demand a high FOMC announcement premium but no premium for risks associated with
BoE, BoJ, and ECB decisions is more complicated than just the importance of the economies
associated with these central banks.
5.2. Exposure to the U.S. economy
While economy size does not explain the absence of announcement premia for non-U.S.
central banks, it can potentially account for the global nature of FOMC premia. Many
rms have major international operations, which can sometimes eclipse the rmsdomestic
business. Such global rms have exposure to economic conditions and policies in countries
other than their home market. Given its status as the largest economy in the world, the
26One potential explanation for these trends is that in the 1950s, 60s, and 70s market participants used
ination and employment numbers to formulate expectations for Fed policy. After the Fed began to com-
municate its policy more clearly to the public starting in the mid-1970s and gaining in clarity in the 1990s,
the information in employment and ination announcements became less important.
27The higher ination announcement premia outside the U.S. may reect the fact that the BoE, BoJ, and
ECB have price stability mandates, which can make them more sensitive to ination than the Fed with its
dual employment-ination mandate.
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U.S. exerts a substantial inuence on the performance of many foreign multinationals. For
example, the U.S. represents the single most important market in terms of revenue for three
of the ve largest FTSE 100 rms (Royal Dutch Shell, Unilever, and GlaxoSmithKline),
four of the ve largest DAX rms (Siemens, Bayer, SAP, and BASF), and one of the ve
Topix 100 rms (Toyota, the largest Japanese corporation).28 With this in mind, it is
perhaps not overly surprising that FOMC decisions impact stock market performance across
the globe. Multinational rms represent a major fraction of total market capitalization in
most countries, and such rms have large direct exposure to the U.S. economy. From this
perspective, there may be nothing special about the Fed beyond its status as the central
bank of the most important economy in the world.
To test whether direct reliance by multinationals on the U.S. economy explains wide-
spread FOMC announcement premia, we study the returns of rms whose operations are
focused on their home market. We use an index tracking the performance of domestic U.K.
rms, which is compiled by the Bank of England using rm-level data from Thompson-
Reuters Worldscope. This index comprises all companies in the FTSE All-Share index that
generate at least 70% of their revenues in the U.K. We validate the U.K. domestic index
by examining its performance after the referendum vote in favor of the U.K. exiting the
European Union on June 23, 2016 (Brexit). While the outcome had global implications, its
e¤ect was strongest in the U.K. itself. We thus expect a more severe Brexit reaction for the
domestic index, as it consists of stocks with high exposure to the U.K. The data conrm this
hypothesis: the U.K.-focused index su¤ered a drop of 11.3% (11.1%) the day (week) after
Brexit, which greatly exceeded the 4.1% drop (0.8% increase) for the aggregate U.K. stock
market.
Table 6 reports the announcement-day returns, non-announcement-day returns, and an-
nouncement premia for the U.K. domestic index. It covers two periods: 1998 through 2016
(our main sample period) and 1995 through 2016 (the entire period for which the index
28We collect geographical revenue breakdown from Factset GeoRev.
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exists). Even for this index that excludes multinationals, the FOMC premium is positive
and signicant, both in USD and British pound (GBP) terms. The premium is actually
higher for the domestic index (47.3 bps in USD and 29.4 in GBP) than for the aggregate
U.K. market over the same period (43.3 bps in USD and 25.3 in GBP). These results, which
are the same over the longer 1995-2016 sample, are not consistent with the hypothesis that
the FOMC premium arises simply due to direct exposure by international stocks to the U.S.
economy.
[TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE.]
Similar intuition potentially applies to central banks outside the U.S. If multinationals
depend only marginally on the economic conditions in the country where they are listed and
they comprise a major fraction of the host stock market, we may be unable to detect at
the aggregate level any risk premia associated with the decisions by that countrys central
bank (or with the signal these decisions provide about economic conditions). However, this
argument does not apply to domestic rms, and therefore for such rms we should observe
a positive risk premium for domestic central bank announcements.
Table 6 shows this is not the case. The BoE announcement premium for the domestic U.K.
index is not statistically signicant, with a negative point estimate. In terms of magnitudes,
the domestic-stock announcement premium of -8.0 bps is very close to the -10.1 bps premium
for the aggregate market. Investors do not demand a risk premium for exposure to BoE
decisions even for stocks of primarily British businesses.
Combined, the ndings here suggest that the Federal Reserve is unique in other ways
than simply being the central bank of the largest global economy. More specically, FOMC
announcement premia do not arise just because the Fed a¤ects, or signals, economic con-
ditions in the U.S., which have a large direct impact on the performance of multinationals
regardless of their home country. Given that FOMC premia also exist, and are similar in
magnitude, for foreign stocks with a domestic focus, the origin of FOMC premia is more
complex.
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5.3. Inert central banks
Another potential explanation for why non-U.S. central banks do not appear to matter to
investors is that these central banks do not pursue active monetary policies (or at least have
not done so during our sample period). In this case, investors would face little uncertainty
regarding these banksdecisions, and consequently exposure to such decisions would not
command a risk premium. However, contrary to this hypothesis, in the period we study the
BoE, ECB, and BoJ all exhibit activist monetary policies, with large variations in interest
rates (see Figure 3) as well as use of unconventional monetary policy tools.
Even if major central banks outside the U.S. engage in active monetary policies, it is still
possible that their decisions are widely anticipated, either by design or inadvertently. This
would reduce the associated uncertainty and thus also reduce any announcement-day risk
premia. For example, a central bank may manage investorsexpectations of monetary policy
so e¤ectively that its announcements are common knowledge before they occur; control of
monetary policy may reside elsewhere (as it did in the U.K. and Japan before 1997 and 1998,
respectively); or a central bank may rely on a rules-based approach in setting interest rates
to such an extent that investors anticipate its decisions based on economic developments.29
Decisions by a central bank might be unsurprising if it is inactive, which we argue above
is not the case, or if it is active but its actions are known to investors in advance of its
announcements. We describe such banks as inert.
If a central bank is inert, its announcements should not be surprising to investors, and
consequently there should be no discernible e¤ect of its announcements on the volatility of
price changes for the a¤ected assets. To explore this hypothesis, we look at the market
most directly impacted by central bank decisions, the one for short-run interest rates in the
relevant currencies. Because this phenomenon is already well explored in the U.S., we study
only the three other central banks, the ECB, BoJ, and BoE. As before, we measure expected
29The evidence above documenting positive domestic premia for employment and ination announcements
in the U.K., Japan, and Germany is consistent with this last hypothesis, with investors updating their
expectations about monetary policy based on information provided by these announcements.
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interest rates using futures contracts, more specically interbank rate futures.
Table 7 shows the results of OLS regressions of daily changes/absolute changes in the
implied interest rates on the relevant central bank announcement dummy for the 1999-2016
period (the period during which all three central banks are independent), with t-statistics
computed using Newey-West standard errors with ve lags. We also include a dummy
variable, Contract Switch, which equals 1 on the rst date of a new contract, to deal
with any e¤ects of switches in the front contract. The specication where the dependent
variable is the absolute change is of special interest, as it tests whether (implied) interest
rate expectations experience larger changes on announcement days. If a given central bank
is inert, we should nd no relation between the absolute change in implied rates and its
announcement dummy.
[TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE.]
Panel I presents the results for Euribor. The rst row shows no relation, either eco-
nomically or statistically, between 3-month Euribor changes implied by futures prices and
the ECB announcement dummy. This is not at all surprising: there is no reason to think
that euro interest rates should on average move in a particular direction when the ECB
announces its policy decisions. However, the second row shows that the absolute value of
Euribor changes is signicantly higher on ECB announcement days, with a coe¢ cient of 1.15
(t-statistic = 6.01), which represents a very meaningful e¤ect relative to the mean of 1.48 bps
on other days. Since implied interest rates on average experience signicantly larger moves
on ECB a-days, we conclude that the content of ECB announcements does not appear to be
fully anticipated by investors.
Panel II shows similar results for futures-implied yen interest rates, which are signicantly
more volatile on BoJ a-days. The absolute value of rate changes is higher on announcement
days than on other days, with a coe¢ cient on the BoJ a-day dummy that is high (0.29 bps
relative to the n-day mean of 0.51 bps) and signicant (t-statistic = 3.78). Finally, Panel
III contains results for sterling futures-implied rates. The key result is again in the second
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row, where we see that the absolute change in futures-implied sterling interbank rates is
1.43 bps (t-statistic = 4.23) higher on BoE a-days relative to the mean of 1.84 on other
days. Overall, our results suggest that the inertness hypothesis cannot explain the lack of a
signicant market risk premium for ECB, BoJ, and BoE announcements.30
5.4. The Fed is unique
Our analysis suggests that in terms of impact on equity risk premia the Fed is unique
among global central banks, and that this impact is not a direct result of the size and im-
portance of the U.S. economy or the level of policy activism by di¤erent central banks. Why
would the Fed be special? One potential explanation is that the Fed is the "worlds central
bank," whose decisions exert greater and more widespread inuence on global developments
than those of other central banks. Consistent with this hypothesis, Table 2 shows that the
common conception that equity markets respond positively to surprise interest rate cuts
actually holds only for the Fed, in whose case it holds universally.
We proceed below by directly testing the hypothesis that the Fed has broader impact on
global equity markets than other major central banks. We then explore a number of reasons
for why the Fed is special in this way, most prominently its potential role as the leader in
setting global monetary policy. In addition to our tests, we also discuss related work and
other evidence consistent with our ndings.
A. Central bank announcements and uncertainty
A potential origin of worldwide FOMC risk premia is that its announcements provide
new information about future monetary policy, the Feds policy function, and/or economic
prospects, and that this information is relevant to equity prices on a global scale. Stanley
Fischer, in his role as the vice chairman of the Fed, shared the view that Feds policies
(and thus information about its policies) have worldwide impact (Fischer (2015)): "There
is little doubt that the aggressive actions the Federal Reserve took to mitigate the e¤ects of
30More informally, we also identify through Google searches multiple surprise decisions by all three central
banks, which resulted in signicant moves in equity, xed income, and currency markets.
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the global nancial crisis signicantly a¤ected asset prices at home and abroad as well as
international capital ows."
To corroborate this hypothesis, we explore changes in forward-looking uncertainty about
stock prices on announcement days. More specically, we test whether central bank an-
nouncements are associated with a decrease in uncertainty in a given equity market, consis-
tent with the release (anticipated by investors) of new information a¤ecting this market.
Our measure of uncertainty is the implied volatility derived from option prices, a standard
proxy in the literature. For the U.S. stock market, we use the VIX, a popular index that
reects the expected 30-day volatility based on implied volatilities of S&P 500 index options.
We collect analogous measures for the other three major markets: the VSTOXX index for
Germany, the VFTSE index for the United Kingdom, and the VXJ index for Japan.
We start by relating equity market uncertainty to domestic central bank announcements.
Panel A of Table 8 presents regressions of log changes in implied volatility (in percent)
on an intercept, an announcement-day dummy for the domestic central bank, contempo-
raneous domestic equity excess returns, and an interaction term between domestic equity
excess returns and the domestic announcement-day dummy. In all countries, we conrm
the well-established negative and statistically signicant relations between implied volatility
and excess returns. Column I shows that a 1% increase in U.S. excess returns is associated
with a 3.95% decrease in the VIX (t-statistic = -26.50). The e¤ect is of similar magnitude
(between 2% and 3%) in the other three markets (Columns II to IV), with high levels of
statistical signicance.
[TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE.]
The coe¢ cient of most interest is the announcement-day dummy for the domestic central
bank. In addition to any change explained by the domestic equity market moves, the VIX
index declines by 1.59% (t-statistic = -4.55) on FOMC a-days, the VSTOXX index by 1.11%
(t-statistic = -3.44) on ECB a-days, and the VFTSE index by 2.44% (t-statistic = -5.70) on
BoE a-days. The estimate for the VXJ index on BoJ a-days is also negative (-0.56%) but
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not quite statistically signicant (t-statistic = -1.57). These results conrm the hypothesis
that the Fed, ECB, and BoE announcements convey information that is relevant for their
domestic stock markets. The interaction term coe¢ cient is negative for all four central banks,
but is never statistically signicant.
Panel B extends the exercise to foreign central bank announcements. It presents the same
set of regressions but now includes announcement-day dummies and interaction terms for all
four major central banks. This test shows that the Fed is unique among central banks in that
its announcements have impact on foreign equity markets. While uncertainty signicantly
decreases in all four equity markets on FOMC a-days, for the non-U.S. central banks the
e¤ect is conned to their domestic market. The coe¢ cient for the FOMC dummy is -1.37
(t-statistic = -3.04) for the VSTOXX index, -1.59 (t-statistic = -3.70) for the VFTSE index,
and -2.22 (t-statistic = -4.44) for the VXJ index. The magnitudes are actually greater for
the Fed than for the ECB in Germany or for the BoJ in Japan. Since FOMC a-day returns
are on average positive globally, a decline in implied volatilities is not necessarily surprising.
However, these estimates control for domestic market returns and also their interaction with
announcement dummies.
Overall, the results in Table 8 indicate that FOMC announcements are associated with
heightened uncertainty in global equity markets, which declines after the Feds decision is
released. In other words, FOMC announcement risk is priced in the option markets, and
in contrast to other major central banks the e¤ect exists globally. This evidence is consis-
tent with Feds decisions having a systematic impact on economic and nancial conditions
globally, while other central banks, even in major countries, have only domestic relevance.
At a daily frequency, it is hard to pin down the transmission channel for Fed policies.
However, recent work uses lower-frequency tests to argue that U.S. monetary policy plays
a key role in the global nancial system. Rey (2013) discusses the existence of a global
nancial cycle in capital ows, asset prices, and credit growth, which co-moves with the
VIX index and has U.S. monetary policy as a major determinant. Miranda-Agrippino and
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Rey (2018) use a Bayesian VAR to study this international transmission channel. They nd
that U.S. monetary policy has an important e¤ect on the balance sheets of systemically
important nancial intermediaries in the U.S. and Europe, as well as on leverage, global
credit growth, credit spreads, and cross-border credit ows. Bruno and Shin (2015) show
that contractionary U.S. monetary policy shocks lead to lower leverage of international banks.
Consistent with the hypothesis that FOMC announcements impact risk premia through their
e¤ect on global nancial intermediaries, we nd that major international banks enjoy FOMC
premia that are even higher than (the already high) premia for the aggregate market, though
these returns are largely explained by the banksbetas (see Table C.3 in the Online Appendix
for details).31
B. The Fed as leader
One channel through which the Fed can inuence global developments is if central banks
outside the U.S. follow its lead in setting monetary policy (the Fed could attain such a
position due to the dominant role of the U.S. dollar in the global economic system, but may
hold the position even in its absence). In this case, FOMC decisions would obviously be of
special importance to equity investors across the world.32
In Panel I of Table 9, we regress daily changes/absolute changes in expected FOMC
target rate on announcement-day dummies for the four central banks we study. As we would
expect, the volatility is signicantly higher on FOMC a-days, with a dummy coe¢ cient of
1.04 (t-statistic = 3.52). This nding is in line with previous studies, and is also consistent
with our earlier results for the BoE, BoJ, and ECB in terms of signs and magnitudes. The
more novel result is that none of the dummy coe¢ cients for the other three central banks are
positive and signicant, suggesting that BoE, BoJ, and ECB announcements do not impact
investor expectations about future Fed decisions.
31The importance of the Fed can also stem from the fact that many globally important nancial interme-
diaries are U.S. institutions. However, the direction of causation is not clear here: the pre-eminence of U.S.
intermediaries can also easily be a consequence, rather than the cause, of the Feds uniqueness.
32Our evidence on central bank inertness shows that the ECB, BoJ, and BoE do surprise investors,
indicating that they at least sometimes act independently and not solely based on FOMC decisions. This,
though, does not mean that the Fed has no impact on their policies.
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We next reverse the analysis and study the relation between FOMC announcements
and interest rate expectations for the other three central banks. We do so by regressing
daily changes and absolute changes in implied interest rates for these central banks on
the FOMC a-day dummy. Panel II shows that the volatility of interest-rate expectations is
signicantly higher on FOMC a-days for the BoJ (t-statistic = 1.93) and the ECB (t-statistic
= 2.69), though not for the BoE (t-statistic = -1.12). This evidence indicates that investors
use FOMC decisions to revise their expectations about future BoJ and ECB actions, and
combined with ndings in Panel I is consistent with a leading role for the Fed.
[TABLE 9 ABOUT HERE.]
If other central banks follow the Fed in setting monetary policy, the importance of their
announcements may increase with the distance from the Feds last announcement. For ex-
ample, if ECBs announcement on a given day was immediately preceded by one from the
Fed, there would be little incremental news associated with the ECB decision. On the other
hand, if the last Fed announcement was six weeks ago, there is greater likelihood that the
ECB announcement would provide new information. However, when we divide other central
banksannouncements based on whether they are close or far away from previous FOMC
announcements, we nd no di¤erence in announcement premia, which are still never statis-
tically signicant. It is possible, though, that central bank announcements occur frequently
enough that there is little scope for divergence from the Feds lead.
The Fed, ECB, and BoE tend to move gradually, typically changing rates multiple times
in the same direction. This tendency is less pronounced for the BoJ, but the reason is that
its rates were at or very close to the zero lower bound during our sample period. Figure 4
plots policy rates for our four central banks over time. It shows that the Fed in general leads
the ECB and BoE (Miranda-Agrippino and Rey (2018) use a Bayesian VAR to estimate the
impact of U.S. monetary policy shocks and get similar results), in line with the hypothesis
that it is the interest rate-cycle leader.33
33There are important instances when these banks diverge from the Fed, such as the most recent period
with the ECB, BoE, and BoJ all engaging in easing policies while the Fed embarked on a tightening cycle.
34
[FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE.]
Finally, there exists other evidence that central banks outside the U.S. adopt policies
developed by the Fed. Most importantly, the Fed was the rst central bank to embark
on a policy of quantitative easing in response to the nancial crisis of 2008-09, starting in
November 2008. The BoE, BoJ, and ECB all eventually followed, and they were not the
only ones, as other central banks, such as the Swiss National Bank and the Swedish National
Bank, also launched quantitative easing. In terms of process, over time the ECB, BoJ, and
BoE all moved to a six-week monetary policy cycle, which is a long-standing Fed approach.
Looking beyond these four central banks, various countries pegged their currencies to the
U.S. dollar at di¤erent points in time (for example, Argentina from 1991 to 2002, many Asian
countries before the crisis of 1997, Hong Kong from 1972 through today), which meant their
central banks e¤ectively had to follow U.S. monetary policy.
Together, the evidence in this section is suggestive of the Feds pre-eminent role among
central banks, both in setting interest rates and deciding other aspects of monetary policy.
C. Fed policy function and capabilities
There exist a number of additional potential explanations for the Feds uniqueness (which
are not mutually exclusive and may actually be related). The Fed may take a broader view
of its role in the global nancial system than other central banks, and consequently engage
in policies that have wider impact. For example, Stanley Fischer argued that "[the Feds]
nancial stability responsibilities do not stop at our borders, given the size and openness of
our capital markets and the unique position of the U.S. dollar as the worlds leading currency
for nancial transaction (Fischer (2015))."
The Fed may also be special in terms of its general capabilities. Its researchers and
proprietary data sources (see Cieslak, Morse, and Vissing-Jorgensen (2018) for a detailed
description) could provide the Fed with better insights into global economic prospects than
any of its peers, in turn increasing the importance of its pronouncements to investors both
locally and globally. Romer and Romer (2000) show that the Fed has information about
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ination that is not known to private forecasters, who update their forecasts in response to
signals provided by Feds monetary-policy actions. This explanation is consistent with our
results on the Feds leading role in setting global monetary policy.
Finally, the Fed is potentially more responsive to stock market developments than other
central banks. Such a stronger relation for the Fed can arise if consumption or investment in
the U.S. respond to equity valuations more than in other countries. The Fed could also care
more about stock market performance for political reasons. Cieslak and Vissing-Jorgensen
(2017) nd that the Fed indeed takes into account stock market conditions, with negative
stock market returns representing a stronger predictor of its rate changes than any commonly
used macroeconomic variables. In line with the above hypothesis, they argue the relation is
causal, with the Fed reacting to stock returns themselves rather than the signal they provide
about the future economic developments.
6. Conclusion
In this paper we show that the high average excess returns previously observed for U.S.
stocks on days with scheduled FOMC announcements also exist in almost all other stock
markets across the globe. Just as in the U.S., the FOMC e¤ect is substantially stronger
(roughly doubling) in recent years. By contrast, almost no stock markets display a similar
e¤ect for non-U.S. central bank announcements, not even the domestic stock markets of
the announcing central banks. These results are not driven by announcement surprises or
currency e¤ects, and are present across di¤erent stock characteristics. They even hold for
stocks of businesses with a domestic focus.
These are puzzling ndings, especially since stock markets outside the U.S. do exhibit
domestic ination and employment announcement e¤ects. Given that the BoE, BoJ, and
ECB represent large and systemically important economies, and given that they pursue
active monetary policies that sometimes surprise investors, why is there no premium around
their announcements? Our conclusion is that the Federal Reserve is unique in its importance
to global investors, and that this uniqueness does not simply stem from the size of the U.S.
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economy and its securities markets.
Why might the Fed be special among central banks? One potential explanation is that
the Fed is the "worlds central bank," whose decision have broader impact than those of
other central banks. In support of this hypothesis, we nd that uncertainty drops across
global markets following FOMC announcements, in contrast to announcements by other
central banks which only have a local e¤ect. We further provide evidence suggesting that
the Fed acts as the leader among central banks in setting monetary policy. These ndings
are consistent with recent work showing that U.S. monetary policy exerts a special inuence
in the global nancial system, a¤ecting the balance sheets of systemically important nan-
cial intermediaries, credit growth and spreads, and cross-border credit ows (Rey (2013),
Miranda-Agrippino and Rey (2018), and Bruno and Shin (2015)).
There are a number of factors, which are not mutually exclusive and are potentially
mutually reenforcing, that could give rise to the Feds unique position. One interesting avenue
is the dominant role of the U.S. dollar in the global trade (Gopinath (2015)) and nancial
system (Shin (2012)), commonly referred to as its reserve currency role. For example, if all
other central banks must to some extent manage the value of their currencies against the
dollar, while the Fed does not have to manage the dollar against other currencies, we would
expect the Fed to enjoy a special freedom of action, its policies to have impact beyond just
the U.S., and for other central banks to follow Feds lead.34 The Fed may also be a leader
among central banks due to its capabilities, its policy function, and its relationship with
Wall Street. We leave further exploration of these important issues to future research.
34An intriguing, though speculative, hypothesis is that the reserve currency is less sensitive to depreciation
in response to money creation, granting the central bank associated with such a currency a unique power to
a¤ect the value of assets around the world.
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Figure 1
Summary Chart for Announcement Premia
This chart reports announcement premia for four major equity markets: Germany (Ger, blue), Japan (Jap, yel-
low), United Kingdom (UK, green), and the United States (US, red). Announcement premia are defined as the
difference between two-day average excess returns (in basis points) on announcement and non-announcement
days. Announcement days are those trading days when interest rate decisions taken by the Federal Reserve
(FOMC, Panel A), the Bank of England (BoE, Panel B), the Bank of Japan (BoJ, Panel C), and the European
Central Bank (ECB, Panel D) are scheduled for release. Non-announcement days are those trading days with
no announcements by any major central bank. Black dots denote confidence intervals (+/-2 standard devia-
tions). Test assets are Datastream Global Equity indices denominated in U.S. dollars. The sample period is
January 1998 (January 1999 for ECB) to December 2016.
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Figure 2
Domestic Announcement Premia for Smaller Central Banks
This chart reports domestic announcement premia for central banks in eight countries: Australia, Brazil,
Canada, Indonesia, Mexico, South Africa, Switzerland, and Turkey. Announcement premia are defined as
the difference between two-day average excess returns (in basis points) on announcement (a-days) and non-
announcement days. Announcement days are those trading days when interest rate decisions taken by the
domestic central bank are scheduled for release. Announcement days conflicting with a-days of the Fed, BoE,
BoJ, and ECB are excluded from the sample. Non-announcement days are those trading days with no scheduled
announcements by the domestic central bank or the Fed, BoE, BoJ, and ECB. Black dots denote confidence
intervals (+/-2 standard deviations). Test assets are Datastream Global Equity indices denominated in U.S.
dollars in Panel A and local currency in Panel B. Two-day announcement windows are defined in Table A.2.
The sample period is January 1998 to December 2016 (data coverage varies across countries).
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Figure 3
Policy Rates Over Time
This chart reports the daily time-series of the policy rates set by the Federal Reserve (Fed, red solid thick
line), the Bank of England (BoE, green dotted line), the European Central Bank (ECB, blue dashed line), and
the Bank of Japan (BoJ, orange solid line). The sample period is January 1998 to December 2016.
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Table 1
Announcement Premia Across Countries: Major Central Banks (1998-2016)
This table reports average two-day excess returns (µ, in basis points) on announcement days (a-days) and
the average excess return difference between announcement and non-announcement days (µa-µn) for 38 global
markets. The number of a-days (Na) and the world average equally-weighted (µa
EW
) and value-weighted
(µa
VW
) a-day excess returns are reported at the bottom of the table. a-days are those trading days when
interest rate decisions taken by the Federal Reserve (FOMC), the Bank of England (BoE), the Bank of Japan
(BoJ), or the European Central Bank (ECB) are scheduled for release. a-day returns are computed over a
two-day window spanning the announcement day and either the following or the previous trading day (see
Table A.2 for details). n-days are those trading days with no scheduled announcements by any major central
bank, with returns also computed over two-day windows. Equity series are Datastream Global Country total
return indices. The daily risk-free rate is obtained from Kenneth French’s website. Returns are denominated
in U.S. dollars. The sample period is January 1998 (January 1999 for ECB) to December 2016. Countries are
grouped into four geographical areas. t-statistics are in square brackets.
Country
I: FOMC II: BoE III: BoJ IV: ECB
µa µa-µn µa µa-µn µa µa-µn µa µa-µn
A: Europe
Austria 45.38 42.03 8.99 5.43 5.65 1.85 4.43 0.71
[2.29] [2.05] [0.68] [0.38] [0.47] [0.14] [0.34] [0.05]
Belgium 35.22 31.78 5.57 1.94 12.06 8.36 20.21 18.70
[1.93] [1.68] [0.45] [0.14] [1.06] [0.67] [1.51] [1.31]
Denmark 53.66 46.08 -12.98 -20.47 7.13 -0.42 13.34 5.13
[2.88] [2.39] [-1.04] [-1.52] [0.60] [-0.03] [1.01] [0.36]
Finland 58.97 56.55 -8.55 -11.29 41.82 38.98 26.85 27.51
[2.57] [2.36] [-0.44] [-0.55] [2.50] [2.15] [1.22] [1.19]
France 45.44 39.69 -10.13 -16.16 12.97 6.85 0.63 -4.07
[2.31] [1.95] [-0.75] [-1.12] [1.11] [0.54] [0.04] [-0.27]
Germany 36.28 32.19 -8.39 -12.73 16.93 12.40 2.06 -0.71
[2.07] [1.76] [-0.61] [-0.86] [1.41] [0.95] [0.15] [-0.05]
Greece 40.80 48.31 7.81 15.34 23.17 30.53 0.98 13.98
[1.56] [1.76] [0.37] [0.68] [1.24] [1.50] [0.05] [0.67]
Ireland 49.00 48.86 4.71 4.16 16.42 15.87 11.22 11.11
[2.26] [2.19] [0.34] [0.28] [1.13] [1.02] [0.79] [0.73]
Italy 43.93 42.27 -4.42 -6.41 9.46 7.58 5.15 6.25
[2.07] [1.92] [-0.29] [-0.40] [0.75] [0.55] [0.35] [0.39]
Netherlands 44.39 41.14 -10.33 -13.69 9.12 5.70 0.60 -1.48
[2.42] [2.15] [-0.78] [-0.97] [0.76] [0.43] [0.04] [-0.10]
Norway 40.21 32.13 -11.51 -19.41 10.38 2.22 2.96 -5.30
[1.68] [1.30] [-0.69] [-1.08] [0.65] [0.13] [0.17] [-0.29]
Poland 42.39 40.99 -13.80 -15.80 14.13 11.90 21.03 19.48
[1.71] [1.59] [-0.78] [-0.83] [0.86] [0.67] [1.19] [1.03]
Portugal 30.64 31.50 10.25 10.52 10.49 10.73 -1.19 0.18
[1.59] [1.58] [0.73] [0.71] [0.92] [0.86] [-0.09] [0.01]
Spain 37.48 33.70 -6.55 -10.65 17.73 13.65 9.09 7.46
[1.82] [1.58] [-0.41] [-0.64] [1.58] [1.09] [0.60] [0.46]
Sweden 63.15 56.44 -17.23 -23.93 21.85 14.92 2.18 -4.45
[2.66] [2.29] [-1.01] [-1.30] [1.44] [0.90] [0.12] [-0.23]
Switzerland 40.38 36.35 -8.89 -13.22 3.70 -0.84 7.78 4.99
[2.80] [2.42] [-0.86] [-1.18] [0.38] [-0.08] [0.77] [0.46]
United Kingdom 44.49 43.35 -8.72 -10.10 9.75 8.26 5.67 4.77
[2.54] [2.39] [-0.71] [-0.77] [0.92] [0.71] [0.46] [0.36]
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Country
I: FOMC II: BoE III: BoJ IV: ECB
µa µa-µn µa µa-µn µa µa-µn µa µa-µn
B: North America
Canada 44.33 40.81 -2.95 -6.58 12.12 8.37 10.60 6.71
[2.75] [2.42] [-0.25] [-0.52] [1.13] [0.71] [0.86] [0.50]
United States 48.41 46.94 -2.95 -4.67 4.32 2.61 9.91 9.32
[3.59] [3.32] [-0.27] [-0.40] [0.43] [0.24] [0.86] [0.76]
C: Asia-Pacific
Australia 40.19 36.42 2.21 -1.67 22.47 18.57 20.77 17.81
[2.16] [1.88] [0.16] [-0.11] [1.82] [1.37] [1.53] [1.21]
Hong Kong 27.12 24.89 -2.25 -4.91 10.91 7.95 28.94 27.60
[1.65] [1.44] [-0.16] [-0.33] [0.89] [0.59] [2.05] [1.84]
Japan 40.40 38.23 -19.24 -21.78 7.71 5.21 3.38 1.84
[2.44] [2.21] [-1.65] [-1.72] [0.59] [0.37] [0.26] [0.13]
New Zealand 26.93 23.52 6.95 3.62 31.21 27.79 18.09 13.33
[1.63] [1.38] [0.65] [0.31] [3.11] [2.55] [1.69] [1.15]
Singapore 40.81 40.58 12.39 11.27 20.74 20.00 17.84 17.13
[2.54] [2.42] [0.99] [0.84] [1.94] [1.70] [1.59] [1.41]
D: Emerging
Argentina 24.60 20.03 3.73 -1.00 -7.03 -11.75 13.30 9.23
[1.16] [0.89] [0.22] [-0.05] [-0.39] [-0.60] [0.82] [0.52]
Brazil 42.85 39.03 -6.19 -9.94 23.77 19.84 18.78 13.48
[1.60] [1.40] [-0.31] [-0.47] [1.36] [1.04] [0.99] [0.66]
Chile 3.21 0.09 13.75 10.69 6.80 3.51 24.04 19.70
[0.26] [0.01] [1.13] [0.83] [0.62] [0.30] [2.24] [1.70]
China 12.28 4.04 2.44 -6.17 18.77 9.74 35.62 27.29
[0.50] [0.16] [0.14] [-0.32] [1.20] [0.56] [2.26] [1.57]
Indonesia 77.23 77.48 35.48 32.49 37.81 36.15 43.95 41.78
[3.25] [3.08] [1.59] [1.35] [1.81] [1.59] [2.56] [2.23]
Malaysia 50.63 46.13 7.02 0.18 1.80 -4.24 14.31 10.29
[3.06] [2.69] [0.56] [0.01] [0.11] [-0.24] [1.51] [1.00]
Mexico 40.71 36.39 -16.49 -20.33 3.92 -0.23 28.06 23.14
[2.37] [2.01] [-1.05] [-1.21] [0.28] [-0.01] [1.85] [1.42]
Philippines 50.01 50.72 15.22 13.60 14.75 14.20 27.34 29.49
[2.97] [2.87] [1.09] [0.90] [0.90] [0.82] [2.27] [2.25]
South Africa 68.15 62.39 -6.49 -12.88 14.26 7.61 -5.68 -12.60
[2.82] [2.49] [-0.39] [-0.72] [1.00] [0.48] [-0.36] [-0.74]
South Korea 87.11 80.39 6.54 -2.67 18.83 11.64 -1.19 -4.43
[3.18] [2.83] [0.34] [-0.13] [1.09] [0.61] [-0.06] [-0.21]
Taiwan 40.51 39.29 -0.02 -2.04 -9.73 -11.67 20.63 17.80
[2.11] [1.96] [-0.00] [-0.13] [-0.67] [-0.75] [1.33] [1.07]
Thailand 23.13 18.00 32.86 24.44 28.27 20.38 12.73 6.86
[1.22] [0.90] [2.07] [1.41] [1.49] [1.01] [0.77] [0.39]
Turkey 100.62 102.32 -15.38 -12.89 23.38 25.31 51.41 51.35
[3.28] [3.17] [-0.63] [-0.49] [0.99] [0.99] [1.77] [1.68]
Venezuela 6.53 -11.01 15.99 -1.24 12.92 -4.85 6.99 -14.21
[0.29] [-0.45] [0.74] [-0.05] [0.63] [-0.21] [0.40] [-0.69]
Na 152 226 284 243
µa
EW
43.36 -0.04 14.23 14.02
µa
VW
44.93 -6.66 7.86 8.23
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Table 2
Central Bank a-day Excess Returns and Monetary Policy Surprises
This table reports coefficients and t-statistics (in square brackets) for OLS regressions of two-day stock market
excess returns on an intercept, a central bank announcement dummy variable (Dat ), and a proxy for central
bank surprises (∆rut ) for 38 global markets:
rit = α+ γD
a
t + δ∆r
u
t + t.
Announcement days (a-days) are those trading days when interest rate decisions taken by the Federal Reserve
(FOMC, Panel I), the Bank of England (BoE, Panel II), the Bank of Japan (BoJ, Panel III), and the European
Central Bank (ECB, Panel VI) are scheduled for release. In Panel I, ∆rut is a measure of unexpected changes
in the Fed funds target proposed by Bernanke and Kuttner (2005). In the other panels, ∆rut is a continuous
time-series of implied rate changes that is based on the nearest-to-maturity 3-month futures price contracts
(Sterling Libor, Euroyen Tibor, and Euribor, respectively). Surprises are cumulated over a two-day window.
Test assets are Datastream Global Country indices denominated in U.S. dollars. Countries are grouped into
four geographical areas. The sample period is January 1999 to December 2016.
Country
I: FOMC II: BoE III: BoJ VI: ECB
γ δ γ δ γ δ γ δ
A: Europe
Austria 38.75 -8.94 9.91 0.24 -4.13 3.78 -0.37 1.78
[2.27] [-3.75] [0.65] [0.35] [-0.30] [1.54] [-0.03] [2.10]
Belgium 26.52 -9.27 3.95 0.89 4.8 4.00 18.39 2.09
[1.62] [-4.06] [0.28] [1.38] [0.36] [1.69] [1.36] [2.61]
Denmark 43.02 -12.30 -18.37 0.83 -6.31 4.08 7.15 2.19
[2.62] [-5.38] [-1.24] [1.24] [-0.48] [1.74] [0.51] [2.66]
Finland 48.61 -8.92 -4.66 1.15 28.44 5.00 23.15 2.83
[2.02] [-2.66] [-0.22] [1.24] [1.53] [1.50] [1.20] [2.48]
France 37.80 -8.01 -11.54 1.46 2.45 2.02 -4.52 2.90
[2.16] [-3.28] [-0.75] [2.12] [0.18] [0.82] [-0.31] [3.40]
Germany 32.92 -1.41 -7.93 2.47 13.85 1.09 -2.39 2.58
[1.92] [-0.59] [-0.52] [3.64] [1.02] [0.45] [-0.17] [3.08]
Greece 39.54 -12.64 20.68 0.95 27.28 6.88 10.37 1.43
[1.52] [-3.48] [0.90] [0.93] [1.29] [1.82] [0.48] [1.12]
Ireland 43.73 -7.97 3.17 0.88 1.04 1.05 9.36 2.89
[2.40] [-3.14] [0.20] [1.23] [0.07] [0.41] [0.64] [3.32]
Italy 38.21 -8.81 -0.06 1.12 8.35 3.05 3.79 2.34
[2.03] [-3.35] [-0.00] [1.54] [0.58] [1.19] [0.25] [2.57]
Netherlands 38.68 -8.61 -8.04 1.31 3.56 2.17 -2.75 3.45
[2.23] [-3.57] [-0.53] [1.94] [0.26] [0.89] [-0.19] [4.09]
Norway 30.56 -9.00 -7.53 1.86 -3.71 3.78 -6.05 3.58
[1.41] [-2.98] [-0.40] [2.20] [-0.22] [1.25] [-0.34] [3.44]
Poland 34.4 -8.51 -17.11 1.03 4.36 5.57 16.68 2.42
[1.53] [-2.71] [-0.87] [1.17] [0.24] [1.73] [0.91] [2.23]
Portugal 26.8 -8.44 13.61 -0.28 4.24 0.14 -1.33 1.47
[1.60] [-3.62] [0.92] [-0.42] [0.33] [0.06] [-0.10] [1.78]
Spain 28.15 -11.46 -3.76 0.98 9.64 1.01 6.15 1.99
[1.51] [-4.42] [-0.23] [1.33] [0.68] [0.39] [0.40] [2.18]
Sweden 53.29 -10.45 -20.2 0.29 11.3 2.42 -6.87 3.96
[2.42] [-3.41] [-1.07] [0.34] [0.65] [0.77] [-0.39] [3.77]
Switzerland 34.68 -5.99 -9.07 1.16 -3.57 0.2 3.57 2.13
[2.50] [-3.10] [-0.75] [2.16] [-0.33] [0.10] [0.31] [3.18]
United Kingdom 38.61 -9.52 -7.23 2.41 5.14 1.74 2.74 2.71
[2.43] [-4.30] [-0.51] [3.82] [0.41] [0.77] [0.21] [3.45]
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Country
I: FOMC II: BoE III: BoJ VI: ECB
γ δ γ δ γ δ γ δ
B: North America
Canada 32.36 -15.18 -5.78 2.20 3.34 3.29 4.10 3.08
[1.94] [-6.52] [-0.39] [3.34] [0.26] [1.44] [0.30] [3.83]
United States 39.71 -12.33 -1.41 3.34 -1.83 0.51 6.00 2.28
[2.82] [-6.28] [-0.12] [6.14] [-0.16] [0.25] [0.52] [3.36]
C: Asia-Pacific
Australia 30.42 -8.44 2.88 2.63 12.29 7.38 15.47 3.43
[1.79] [-3.57] [0.19] [3.81] [0.83] [2.73] [1.12] [4.32]
Hong Kong 18.97 -6.75 4.23 2.02 5.05 6.11 25.65 2.04
[1.07] [-2.74] [0.29] [3.01] [0.38] [2.47] [1.92] [2.65]
Japan 34.54 -9.44 -18.88 2.76 0.15 11.16 -0.13 3.08
[2.15] [-4.21] [-1.37] [4.31] [0.01] [4.69] [-0.01] [4.26]
New Zealand 17.9 -7.41 2.98 1.99 24.99 3.49 11.95 1.91
[1.28] [-3.80] [0.25] [3.58] [2.16] [1.65] [1.07] [2.97]
Singapore 34.03 -6.4 14.80 1.10 11.83 7.81 13.54 2.35
[2.18] [-2.94] [1.21] [1.94] [1.00] [3.60] [1.19] [3.58]
D: Emerging
Argentina 20.24 -3.80 14.55 0.73 -3.54 2.81 10.41 1.36
[0.83] [-1.12] [0.70] [0.79] [-0.19] [0.84] [0.54] [1.20]
Brazil 27.00 -17.55 -8.92 1.76 22.91 5.06 8.66 2.07
[1.07] [-4.98] [-0.40] [1.78] [1.14] [1.41] [0.42] [1.68]
Chile -5.67 -6.96 17.56 1.00 -1.72 1.94 18.85 1.32
[-0.39] [-3.41] [1.38] [1.76] [-0.15] [0.97] [1.57] [1.86]
China -5.43 -13.32 -0.73 0.37 12.07 4.32 26.26 1.14
[-0.23] [-4.10] [-0.04] [0.40] [0.65] [1.28] [1.44] [1.09]
Indonesia 69.01 -3.58 23.92 0.94 15.92 8.70 37.11 4.54
[2.29] [-0.85] [1.15] [0.97] [0.80] [2.39] [1.89] [4.02]
Malaysia 46.59 -0.87 8.23 0.41 -2.17 4.05 8.59 1.40
[2.63] [-0.35] [0.72] [0.78] [-0.20] [2.05] [0.80] [2.27]
Mexico 30.00 -11.87 -17.11 2.48 6.87 -0.13 21.53 2.23
[1.54] [-4.38] [-1.05] [3.39] [0.46] [-0.05] [1.39] [2.44]
Philippines 44.81 -2.93 22.06 1.42 14.92 5.34 24.14 2.34
[2.45] [-1.15] [1.48] [2.05] [1.06] [2.07] [1.78] [2.99]
South Africa 57.84 -11.13 -9.05 0.59 5.65 1.00 -17.9 2.35
[2.66] [-3.67] [-0.48] [0.70] [0.33] [0.33] [-1.00] [2.22]
South Korea 66.23 -22.72 -4.04 0.55 2.19 8.45 -10.68 1.18
[2.55] [-6.29] [-0.19] [0.57] [0.11] [2.32] [-0.56] [1.06]
Taiwan 34.67 -8.69 -1.28 2.08 -20.53 4.15 19.58 1.50
[1.83] [-3.29] [-0.08] [2.76] [-1.35] [1.49] [1.31] [1.73]
Thailand 10.10 -5.86 22.74 1.29 7.32 3.82 4.59 2.98
[0.45] [-1.86] [1.32] [1.62] [0.46] [1.30] [0.28] [3.20]
Turkey 96.38 -2.47 -13.25 1.54 8.85 -3.69 45.52 3.89
[2.83] [-0.52] [-0.46] [1.20] [0.34] [-0.79] [1.67] [2.42]
Venezuela -7.51 -1.91 2.47 0.43 -4.77 3.27 -10.95 0.21
[-0.22] [-0.39] [0.09] [0.34] [-0.22] [0.82] [-0.40] [0.13]
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Table 3
Announcement Premia Across Countries: Domestic vs. USD Excess Returns
This table reports the average two-day excess return difference in domestic currency terms between announce-
ment and non-announcement days (LOC, in basis points), namely the announcement premium, and the dif-
ference between the announcement premium denominated in U.S. dollars and the announcement premium
denominated in local currency (USD-LOC, in basis points) for 38 global markets. Announcement days (a-
days) are those trading days when interest rate decisions taken by the Federal Reserve (FOMC, Panel I),
the Bank of England (BoE, Panel II), the Bank of Japan (BoJ, Panel III), and the European Central Bank
(ECB, Panel IV) are scheduled for release. a-day returns are computed over a two-day window spanning the
announcement day and either the following or the previous trading day (see Table A.2 for details). n-days are
those trading days with no scheduled announcements by any major central bank, with returns also computed
over two-day windows. Equity series are Datastream Global Country total return indices. The daily risk-free
rate is obtained from Kenneth French’s website. The sample period is January 1998 (January 1999 for ECB)
to December 2016. Countries are grouped into four geographical areas. t-statistics are in square brackets.
I: FOMC II: BoE III: BoJ IV: ECB
LOC USD-LOC LOC USD-LOC LOC USD-LOC LOC USD-LOC
A: Europe
Austria 31.64 10.39 2.86 2.57 0.37 1.48 6.71 -6.00
[2.07] [0.24] [0.03] [0.59]
Belgium 21.57 10.21 -0.66 2.59 6.87 1.49 24.61 -5.90
[1.36] [-0.06] [0.61] [1.97]
Denmark 35.92 10.16 -23.02 2.55 -1.50 1.08 11.32 -6.20
[2.31] [-1.94] [-0.13] [0.92]
Finland 46.17 10.38 -13.94 2.66 37.49 1.49 33.62 -6.12
[2.21] [-0.72] [2.11] [1.51]
France 29.13 10.56 -18.89 2.74 5.38 1.47 1.92 -5.99
[1.79] [-1.47] [0.46] [0.14]
Germany 22.07 10.11 -15.31 2.59 10.85 1.55 5.29 -6.00
[1.45] [-1.13] [0.90] [0.40]
Greece 37.66 10.65 13.02 2.32 30.37 0.16 19.88 -5.90
[1.56] [0.63] [1.63] [1.06]
Ireland 38.65 10.21 2.35 1.80 14.24 1.63 17.10 -5.99
[2.04] [0.18] [0.98] [1.23]
Italy 31.83 10.44 -8.97 2.57 6.15 1.42 12.28 -6.03
[1.84] [-0.62] [0.49] [0.89]
Netherlands 30.79 10.35 -16.33 2.63 4.21 1.49 4.52 -6.00
[1.99] [-1.28] [0.34] [0.35]
Norway 25.11 7.02 -22.75 3.34 -0.67 2.89 -3.94 -1.36
[1.48] [-1.51] [-0.05] [-0.27]
Poland 30.52 10.47 -10.80 -5.00 8.16 3.74 16.24 3.24
[1.64] [-0.73] [0.57] [1.09]
Portugal 21.02 10.48 7.32 3.20 9.08 1.64 6.09 -5.91
[1.45] [0.58] [0.84] [0.51]
Spain 23.42 10.28 -13.38 2.72 12.29 1.36 13.41 -5.95
[1.38] [-0.91] [1.09] [0.98]
Sweden 49.43 7.01 -26.99 3.06 10.08 4.84 -2.05 -2.40
[2.72] [-1.78] [0.71] [-0.13]
Switzerland 22.61 13.74 -16.27 3.05 -0.47 -0.37 12.14 -7.15
[1.85] [-1.52] [-0.05] [1.20]
United Kingdom 25.26 18.10 -12.60 2.50 -0.81 9.07 3.45 1.32
[1.79] [-1.11] [-0.08] [0.29]
B: North America
Canada 32.86 7.95 -13.50 6.93 6.53 1.84 5.24 1.48
[2.59] [-1.37] [0.70] [0.48]
United States 46.94 - -4.67 - 2.61 - 9.32 -
[3.32] [-0.40] [0.24] [0.76]
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I: FOMC II: BoE III: BoJ IV: ECB
LOC USD-LOC LOC USD-LOC LOC USD-LOC LOC USD-LOC
C: Asia-Pacific
Australia 27.59 8.83 -9.97 8.30 2.03 16.54 6.38 11.43
[2.44] [-1.07] [0.23] [0.66]
Hong Kong 24.63 0.26 -4.94 0.03 7.64 0.31 26.95 0.65
[1.43] [-0.34] [0.57] [1.80]
Japan 43.85 -5.62 -17.13 -4.65 2.98 2.23 12.88 -11.03
[2.55] [-1.28] [0.22] [0.91]
New Zealand 12.37 11.16 -3.17 6.79 7.30 20.49 3.68 9.66
[1.52] [-0.46] [1.15] [0.54]
Singapore 37.20 3.39 9.97 1.30 10.65 9.35 13.83 3.30
[2.72] [0.85] [1.03] [1.26]
D: Emerging
Argentina 17.67 2.36 -10.22 9.23 -9.61 -2.15 2.56 6.67
[0.78] [-0.58] [-0.63] [0.15]
Brazil 44.91 -5.88 -3.81 -6.13 13.04 6.80 16.10 -2.62
[2.35] [-0.24] [0.97] [1.07]
Chile 3.00 -2.90 -4.11 14.80 2.26 1.25 4.70 15.00
[0.32] [-0.44] [0.26] [0.53]
China -8.17 12.21 5.60 -11.77 17.89 -8.15 10.79 16.50
[-0.45] [0.39] [1.31] [0.78]
Indonesia 46.37 31.11 27.24 5.25 26.76 9.40 27.12 14.65
[2.21] [1.50] [1.52] [1.86]
Malaysia 26.12 20.00 1.17 -0.99 5.04 -9.28 6.66 3.63
[2.23] [0.11] [0.44] [0.73]
Mexico 30.97 5.42 -13.71 -6.62 -0.35 0.12 22.48 0.66
[2.29] [-1.09] [-0.03] [1.73]
Philippines 42.17 8.55 13.88 -0.28 13.41 0.79 19.87 9.63
[2.77] [1.02] [0.99] [1.80]
South Africa 50.02 12.37 -8.40 -4.48 9.60 -1.99 -7.46 -5.15
[3.22] [-0.67] [0.83] [-0.59]
South Korea 55.52 24.87 1.86 -4.54 20.96 -9.32 0.14 -4.56
[2.94] [0.11] [1.33] [0.01]
Taiwan 31.51 7.78 -4.27 2.23 -11.51 -0.16 14.91 2.89
[1.72] [-0.29] [-0.79] [0.95]
Thailand 12.41 5.60 27.82 -3.38 15.29 5.09 7.35 -0.49
[0.70] [1.83] [0.85] [0.45]
Turkey 68.44 33.88 -19.89 7.00 11.90 13.41 34.63 16.71
[2.60] [-0.89] [0.56] [1.37]
Venezuela -35.20 24.19 -9.52 8.28 -14.48 9.64 -23.46 9.25
[-1.74] [-0.54] [-0.84] [-1.71]
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Table 4
Announcement Premia Across Equity Characteristics
This table reports average excess returns (µ, in basis points) for indices based on equity characteristics for stock markets in the United States (US), the
United Kingdom (UK), Japan (Jap), and Germany (Ger). For each country, the table shows average two-day excess returns on announcement- (µa) and
non-announcement days (µn), as well as the difference between returns on the two types of days (µa-µn). Panel I covers announcements by the Federal Reserve,
and Panel II covers announcements by the domestic central bank for each country (the Bank of England, the Bank of Japan, and the European Central Bank).
Announcement-day returns are computed over a two-day window spanning the announcement day and the previous trading day. Non-announcement days are
those trading days with no scheduled announcements by any major central bank. Equity series are MSCI Style Indices from Datastream. The sample period
is January 2001 to December 2016. The number of a-days (Na) is reported at the bottom of each panel. t-statistics are in square brackets.
I: FOMC announcements II: Domestic CB announcements
US UK Jap Ger US UK Jap Ger UK Jap Ger UK Jap Ger
A: Large Caps B: Small Caps A: Large Caps B: Small Caps
µa 35.93 46.88 47.88 56.42 51.06 56.04 40.67 59.62 -0.30 13.61 8.95 13.33 17.28 9.19
[2.38] [2.28] [2.50] [2.54] [2.89] [2.88] [2.52] [2.72] [-0.02] [1.04] [0.50] [0.95] [1.37] [0.55]
µn 3.58 -0.06 0.79 2.43 8.50 2.10 6.03 6.47 0.07 0.69 2.43 2.06 5.96 6.47
[0.82] [-0.01] [0.15] [0.39] [1.57] [0.39] [1.20] [1.07] [0.01] [0.13] [0.39] [0.38] [1.18] [1.07]
µa − µn 32.36 46.94 47.08 53.99 42.56 53.94 34.64 53.15 -0.37 12.92 6.51 11.27 11.31 2.72
[2.06] [2.21] [2.37] [2.34] [2.30] [2.67] [2.05] [2.34] [-0.03] [0.92] [0.34] [0.75] [0.83] [0.15]
C: Value D: Growth C: Value D: Growth
µa 40.20 51.02 49.89 70.17 33.64 51.26 46.14 47.50 3.08 8.58 8.55 -3.59 18.58 8.74
[2.48] [2.41] [2.64] [2.36] [2.24] [2.54] [2.43] [2.25] [0.22] [0.69] [0.46] [-0.24] [1.38] [0.49]
µn 4.85 -0.05 2.43 1.47 3.30 0.74 0.80 3.64 0.10 2.44 1.47 0.87 0.66 3.64
[1.04] [-0.01] [0.48] [0.21] [0.74] [0.14] [0.15] [0.58] [0.02] [0.48] [0.21] [0.16] [0.12] [0.58]
µa − µn 35.34 51.08 47.47 68.71 30.34 50.52 45.34 43.87 2.98 6.14 7.08 -4.46 17.92 5.11
[2.10] [2.33] [2.43] [2.25] [1.94] [2.42] [2.30] [1.99] [0.20] [0.46] [0.35] [-0.29] [1.24] [0.27]
Na 128 128 128 128 128 128 128 128 190 227 196 190 227 196
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Table 5
Domestic Announcement Premia for Macroeconomic Announcements
This table shows daily average excess returns (µ, in basis points) on domestic announcement days (a-days), the
number of a-days in each sample (Na), and the average excess return difference between announcement- and
non-announcement days (µa-µn) for the United States, United Kingdom, Japan, and Germany. Announcement
days are those trading days when employment numbers (Panel I) and inflation numbers (Panel II) are scheduled
for release in each country. Non-announcement days are those trading days with no scheduled central bank
and macroeconomic announcements in any of the four major economies. Equity series are Datastream Global
Country total return indices. The daily risk-free rate is obtained from Kenneth French’s website. Returns
are denominated in U.S. dollars. The sample period starts with the first available announcement and ends in
December 2016. t-statistics are in square brackets.
Country
I: Employment II: Inflation
µa Na µa-µn µa Na µa-µn
United States 4.40 528 2.87 7.03 526 5.51
[0.94] [0.60] [1.42] [1.09]
United Kingdom 9.56 395 9.74 10.82 423 10.94
[1.62] [1.58] [1.97] [1.90]
Japan 7.82 527 7.06 12.77 528 12.06
[1.32] [1.16] [2.40] [2.18]
Germany 16.12 406 14.74 11.42 481 10.44
[2.69] [2.36] [2.06] [1.81]
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Table 6
Announcement Premia: UK-Focused Equity Index
This table reports average excess returns for a sub-index of the UK stock market on announcement (µa)
and non-announcement days (µn), as well as the difference between excess returns on the two types of days
(µa-µn). This sub-index comprises all companies in the FTSE All-Share index that generate at least 70%
of their revenues in the United Kingdom. It is compiled by the Bank of England using firm-level data from
Thompson-Reuters Worldscope. The left panel covers announcements by the Federal Reserve (FOMC) and the
Bank of England (BoE) from January 1998 to December 2016. In the right panel, the sample starts in January
1995. Announcement-day returns are computed over a two-day window spanning the announcement day and
the previous trading day. Non-announcement days are those trading days with no scheduled announcements
by any major central bank. Returns are denominated in U.S. dollars in Panel I and British pounds in Panel
II.
1998-2016 1995-2016
FOMC BoE FOMC
µ Obs µ Obs µ Obs
Panel I: USD
µa 43.85 152 -12.95 226 49.61 176
[2.59] [-1.06] [3.30]
µn -3.46 1739 -4.91 1727 -2.10 2067
[-0.73] [-1.03] [-0.51]
µa − µn 47.31 -8.03 51.72
[2.69] [-0.61] [3.31]
Panel II: GBP
µa 28.46 152 -12.41 226 32.56 176
[2.21] [-1.19] [2.85]
µn -0.98 1739 -1.90 1727 0.21 2067
[-0.25] [-0.47] [0.06]
µa − µn 29.44 -10.50 32.35
[2.19] [-0.94] [2.71]
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Table 7
Central Bank Announcements and Domestic Interest Rate Changes
This table presents the results of OLS regressions of daily interbank rate futures on announcement-day dummies
for the Bank of England, the Bank of Japan, and the European Central Bank. In Panel I, the dependent
variable is the change or absolute change in the 3-month futures-implied Euribor rate (in basis points), and
the announcement day dummy is set to 1 on days of scheduled ECB announcements and to 0 otherwise. In
Panel II, the dependent variable is the change or absolute change in the 3-month futures-implied Euroyen Tibor
rate (in basis points), and the announcement day dummy is set to 1 on days of scheduled BoJ announcements
and to 0 otherwise. In Panel III, the dependent variable is the change or absolute change in the 3-month
futures-implied Sterling Libor rate (in basis points), and the announcement day dummy is set to 1 on days of
scheduled BoE announcements and to 0 otherwise. Contract switch is a dummy variable for days of contract
changes, which occur when we roll the futures contract to the next available one. The last column reports
the R-squared (in percent). Newey-West t-statistics are in brackets. The sample period is January 1999 to
December 2016.
Intercept a-day Contract Switch R2 (%)
Panel I: 3-month futures-implied Euribor
∆(Euribor) -0.09 0.25 0.22 0.03
[-1.53] [0.96] [1.98]
|∆(Euribor)| 1.48 1.15 -1.01 0.79
[20.75] [6.01] [-11.94]
Panel II: 3-month futures-implied Euroyen Tibor
∆(Tibor) -0.02 0.10 0.12 0.05
[-1.02] [0.99] [2.68]
|∆(Tibor)| 0.51 0.29 -0.28 0.49
[18.58] [3.78] [-8.04]
Panel III: 3-month futures-implied Sterling Libor
∆(SterlingLibor) -0.09 -0.39 -0.08 0.03
[-1.38] [-0.91] [-0.28]
|∆(SterlingLibor)| 1.84 1.43 -0.72 0.60
[20.07] [4.23] [-3.01]
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Table 8
Announcement Days: Excess Returns and Changes in Implied Volatility
This table presents OLS regressions of log changes in domestic implied volatility (in percent) for four major
equity markets: the United States (US, Column I), Germany (Ger, Column II), the United Kingdom (UK,
Column III), and Japan (Column IV). In Panel A, log changes are regressed on a intercept, an announcement-
day dummy for the domestic central bank (Dat ), domestic equity excess returns (rett), and the interaction
term between the dummy variable and the excess return (retat ). Panel B presents the same regressions with
the addition of announcement-day dummies and interaction terms for the three foreign major central banks.
Implied volatility is measured by the VIX index in the United States, the VSTOXX index in Germany, the
VFTSE index in the United Kingdom, and the VXJ index in Japan. Test assets are Datastream Global Equity
indices denominated in U.S. dollars. Newey-West t-statistics are in brackets. The sample period is January
1998 to December 2016.
I: US equity II: Ger equity III: UK equity IV: Japan equity
∆ VIX (%) ∆ VSTOXX (%) ∆ VFTSE (%) ∆ VXJ(%)
coeff t-stat coeff t-stat coeff t-stat coeff t-stat
A: Domestic central bank announcements
Intercept 0.14 [2.50] 0.10 [1.66] 0.13 [1.94] -0.05 [-0.66]
rett -3.95 [-26.50] -2.52 [-20.69] -2.92 [-17.88] -2.00 [-18.00]
Dat -1.59 [-4.55] -1.11 [-3.44] -2.44 [-5.70] -0.56 [-1.57]
retat -0.38 [-0.74] -0.10 [-0.34] -0.45 [-0.94] -0.61 [-1.13]
B: Domestic and foreign central bank announcements
Intercept 0.18 [2.93] 0.18 [2.72] 0.21 [2.94] 0.01 [0.17]
rett -3.96 [-26.00] -2.55 [-19.61] -2.92 [-16.74] -2.11 [-17.10]
DFOMCt -1.61 [-4.59] -1.37 [-3.04] -1.59 [-3.70] -2.22 [-4.44]
retFOMCt -0.38 [-0.73] 0.54 [1.83] 0.10 [0.31] 1.58 [4.26]
DECBt -0.50 [-1.71] -1.03 [-3.01] -0.36 [-0.86] -0.43 [-1.27]
retECBt 0.51 [1.48] 0.19 [0.52] -0.25 [-0.38] 0.14 [0.47]
DBoEt 0.12 [0.39] -0.08 [-0.24] -2.22 [-4.40] 0.40 [1.06]
retBoEt -0.63 [-1.53] -0.61 [-1.80] -0.32 [-0.47] 0.65 [1.93]
DBoJt -0.26 [-0.99] -0.60 [-2.29] -0.39 [-1.18] -0.54 [-1.53]
retBoJt 0.24 [0.60] 0.35 [1.01] 0.00 [0.00] -0.61 [-1.17]
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Table 9
Central Bank Announcements and Global Interest Rate Changes
This table presents the results of OLS regressions of the Federal funds rate on announcement-day dummies for
the Bank of England (BoE), the Bank of Japan (BoJ), the European Central Bank (ECB), and the Federal
Reserve (Fed) in Panel I. In Panel II, it reports the results of OLS regressions of interest rates for the U.K.,
Japan, the eurozone, and the U.S. on the announcement dummy for the Fed. Interest rates are, respectively,
3-month futures-implied Sterling Libor rate, 3-month futures-implied Euroyen Tibor rate, 3-month futures-
implied Euribor rate, and the Federal funds futures-implied rate. In both panels, the dependent variable is
the change (∆i) or absolute change (|∆i|) in the interest rate. The announcement day dummy is set to 1 on
days of scheduled central bank announcements and to 0 otherwise. All regressions include a dummy variable
for days of contract changes, which occur when we roll the futures contract to the next available one. For
announcements made by the Federal Reserve, implied rates are cumulated over a two-day window spanning
the FOMC meeting day and either the following or the previous trading day (see Table A.2 for details). All
rates are expressed in basis points. Newey-West t-statistics are in brackets. The sample period is January
1999 to December 2016.
Panel I: Impact of central bank announcements on Federal funds rate
Interest rate
a-day
BoE BoJ ECB Fed
∆i 0.07 -0.23 -0.27 -0.05
Fed funds [0.77] [-0.97] [-1.07] [-0.15]
|∆i| -0.33 0.11 0.37 1.04
[-4.12] [0.52] [1.61] [3.52]
Panel II: Impact of FOMC announcements on futures-implied rates
a-day
Interest rates
Sterling Libor Tibor Euribor Fed funds
∆i -0.18 -0.37 -1.56 -0.05
Fed [-0.28] [-1.39] [-1.90] [-0.15]
|∆i| -0.51 0.47 1.99 1.04
[-1.12] [1.93] [2.69] [3.52]
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One Central Bank to Rule Them All
- Supplementary Online Appendix -
This Appendix is divided into three sections. Section A complements the data section
in the main text. It provides further details about index construction, announcement times
and dates, and time and date alignment across time zones. Section B presents the findings
on the World CAPM on central bank announcement days. Section C reports the breakdown
of two-day average excess returns around major central bank announcement days, FOMC
premia over a longer sample period, and FOMC premia for global banks.
1
A Data Appendix
Table A.1
U.S. Announcements: Timing around the globe
This table reports country details about the timing of announcement days (a-days) and data coverage. Coun-
tries are grouped into four geographical regions (Europe, North America, Asia-Pacific, Emerging) and are
listed in Column 1. Columns 2 and 3 report, respectively, the minimum and maximum time difference between
the country local time and Eastern Standard Time, where the time difference is measured in number of hours
h. Column 4 reports country trading hours (in local time). Columns 5 presents the timing of announcement
days around the globe. Announcement days are those trading days when FOMC interest rate decisions are
scheduled for release in the United States. According to the time zone, country-i a-days either coincide with
U.S. a-days (Same) or are led by one day (Next). The last column reports the starting date of the return series
for each Datastream Country Global Equity Index.
Country
Time Difference (h) Trading Hours a-days Timing
Data Coverage
Min Max (Local Time) FOMC
Europe
Austria 5 7 08:55-17:35 Next 02-Jan-73
Belgium 5 7 09:00-17:40 Next 02-Jan-73
Denmark 5 7 9:00-17:00 Next 03-Jan-73
Finland 6 8 10:00-18:30 Next 28-Mar-88
France 5 7 9:00-17:35 Next 02-Jan-73
Germany 5 7 09:00-17:30 Next 02-Jan-73
Greece 6 8 10:30-17:00 Next 02-Jan-90
Ireland 4 6 08:00-16:30 Next 02-Jan-73
Italy 5 7 9:05-17:35 Next 02-Jan-73
Netherlands 5 7 09:00-17:30 Next 02-Jan-73
Norway 5 7 9:00-16:20 Next 03-Jan-80
Poland 5 7 09:00-16:50 Next 02-Mar-94
Portugal 4 7 08:00-16:30 Next 03-Jan-90
Spain 5 7 09:00-17:30 Next 03-Mar-87
Sweden 5 7 09:00-17:30 Next 05-Jan-82
Switzerland 5 7 09:00-17:30 Next 02-Jan-73
United Kingdom 4 6 8:00-16:30 Next 02-Jan-73
North America
Canada -1 0 9:30-16:00 Same 02-Jan-73
United States 0 0 9:30-16:00 Same 02-Jan-73
Asia-Pacific
Australia 14 16 10:00-16:00 Next 02-Jan-73
Hong Kong 12 14 9:30-12:30, 14:30-16:00 Next 02-Jan-73
Japan 13 14 9:00-11:30, 12:30-15:00 Next 02-Jan-73
New Zealand 17 18 10:00-16:45 Next 05-Jan-88
Singapore 11.5 13 9:00-12:30, 14:00:-17:00 Next 02-Jan-73
Emerging
Argentina 1 3 11:00-17:00 Same 03-Aug-93
Brazil 1 3 11:00-18:00 Same 05-Jul-94
Chile 0 2 09:00-17:30 Same 04-Jul-89
China 12 13 09:30-11:30, 13.00-15.00 Next 27-Jul-93
Indonesia 11 12 09:30-12:00, 13.30-16.00 Next 03-Apr-90
Malaysia 11.5 13 09:00-12:30, 14.30-17.00 Next 03-Jan-86
Mexico -2 -1 08:30-15:00 Same 11-May-89
Philippines 12 14 09:30-12:10 Next 09-Nov-88
South Africa 6 7 09:00-17:00 Next 02-Jan-73
South Korea 13 14 09:00-15:00 Next 10-Sep-87
Taiwan 12 13 9:55-12:30, 14:45-16:40 Next 03-May-88
Thailand 11 12 09:00-13:30 Next 05-Jan-87
Turkey 6 9 09:30-12:30, 14:00-17:30 Same 13-Jun-89
Venezuela -0.5 1 Same 03-Jan-90
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Table A.2
Two-Day Windows: Monetary Policy Announcements
This table defines two-day trading windows around the scheduled monetary policy announcements of the
central banks examined in the main text. Panel I presents FOMC windows, Panel II shows BoE, BoJ, and ECB
windows, and Panel III covers smaller central banks. FOMC/Major CB/Domestic CB denote the trading day
when the announcement of the central bank of interest is scheduled to take place. Previous and Next denote,
respectively, the trading day before and after each scheduled monetary policy announcement. Countries are
grouped by geographical area (Asia-Pacific, North America, Europe, Western/Eastern Emerging) in Panel I
and Panel II. Panel III lists the countries where the smaller central banks are located.
Panel I: FOMC
Group A: Group B:
North America and Western Emerging Europe, Asia-Pacific and Eastern Emerging
Previous FOMC Next
Pre Feb-94 a-day 1 a-day 2
Afterwards a-day 1 a-day 2
Previous FOMC Next
Pre Feb-94 a-day 1 a-day 2
Afterwards a-day 1 a-day 2
Panel II: BoE/BoJ/ECB
Group A: Group B:
Europe, North America, and Western Emerging Asia-Pacific and Eastern Emerging
Previous Major CB Next
a-day 1 a-day 2
Previous Major CB Next
a-day 1 a-day 2
Panel III: Smaller Central Banks
Group A: Group B:
Canada, Indonesia, Mexico
South Africa, Switzerland, Turkey Brazil
Previous Domestic CB Next
a-day 1 a-day 2
Previous Domestic CB Next
a-day 1 a-day 2
Group C
Australia
Previous Domestic CB Next
Pre Jan-07 a-day 1 a-day 2
Afterwards a-day 1 a-day 2
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Table A.4
Scheduled Monetary Policy Announcements by Smaller Central Banks
This table reports details about scheduled releases of interest rate decisions for the set of smaller central banks.
Column 1 and Column 2 present countries and the associated central banks. Column 3 shows the number of
scheduled monetary policy announcements (a-days) over the period January 1998 to December 2016. Column
4 summarizes information about the frequency and timing of those announcements.
Country Central bank a-days Frequency and timing of announcements
Australia Reserve Bank 206 Eleven meetings per year, on the first Tuesday of the
of Australia month except in January. Decisions announced the next day
at 9.30am until December 2007, and on the meeting day at
2.30pm since 2008.
Brazil Banco Central 181 Monthly meetings from January 1998 to December 2005
do Brazil (few exceptions in 1998 and 1999). Eight meetings per
year since 2006. Decisions announced on the last day of
meeting after the closing time of local financial markets.
Canada Bank of Canada 128 Eight meetings per year since December 2000. Decisions
announced at 9am. Notes: Bank of Canada releases the
schedule of forthcoming announcements rather than
meeting dates.
Indonesia Bank Sentral 140 Monthly meetings (with few exceptions) since July 2005.
Republik Indonesia Press release published on meeting day.
Mexico Banco de 174 Twice per month from 2003 to 2005 (once in
Mexico December). Monthly meetings in 2006 and 2007. Eleven
meetings per year from 2008 to 2010. Eight meetings per
year afterwards. Decisions announced at 9am until
December 2014, and at 1pm afterwards.
South Africa South African 108 Six meetings per year since 2004. Press release published
Reserve Bank on the last meeting day (two- or three-day meetings).
Switzerland Swiss National 67 Quarterly meetings (March, June, September, December)
Bank since March 2000. Press release published on meeting day.
Turkey Central Bank of the 142 Monthly meetings (with few exceptions) since January
Republic of Turkey 2005. Decisions announced at 2pm.
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B World CAPM on central bank announcement days
We construct the world market portfolio from the 38 stock markets covered in our paper.
Country index returns are denominated in USD and are weighted by one-month lagged total
market capitalization, which we obtain from Datastream. Weights are rebalanced at the end
of each month. The correlation between daily returns of our world market portfolio and the
MSCI World Index (available since February 2001) is 99%. The FOMC risk premium for the
world market portfolio is 37.1 bps (t-statistic = 2.75), and is economically and statistically
higher than its announcement premium for other central banks, confirming our prior results.
We construct test portfolios from stocks from four major markets: Germany, Japan, the
U.K., and the U.S. Data coverage is proportional to stock market size: the average number of
stocks in each decile portfolio is 75 for Germany, 344 for Japan, 112 for the U.K., and 660 for
the U.S. We estimate the betas of all listed stocks in our four markets with the world market
portfolio by regressing their returns on a constant and the world market portfolio return,
employing rolling windows of 250 trading days (approximately 1 year).
We next sort all stocks by their betas into ten value-weighted portfolios, and then es-
timate the betas of these beta-sorted portfolios over the full sample. We use two different
methodologies for the sorting procedure. In the first approach, we sort stocks by betas within
each country, resulting in four sets of ten value-weighted portfolios. For each decile, we then
equal-weight the four associated country portfolios. This approach ensures that all countries
are represented equally in the resulting test portfolios, but there may be substantial varia-
tion in stock betas within each portfolio. In the second approach, we pool all stocks in our
sample and then sort them into ten beta portfolios, regardless of their country. These pooled
portfolios will have much less variation in stock betas within each portfolio, but country rep-
resentation will vary across portfolios (typically, the proportion of U.S. stocks increases in
higher-beta portfolios).
There is wide variation in world market portfolio betas in all four countries. In the U.S.,
the difference between the highest- and lowest-beta portfolios is 2.3, which is considerably
greater than the range for the domestic CAPM. The range is 1.6 for the U.K., 1.2 for Japan,
6
and 2.1 for Germany. For the pooled test portfolios the range is 2.1.1 Having such a large
range increases the power of tests of the world CAPM compared to the domestic CAPM in
the U.S. (see Kan & Zhang (1999) and Bryzgalova (2014)).
Figure B.1 plots the average excess returns against the betas for the ten beta-sorted
portfolios, and does so separately for different central bank a-days and n-days. Panel I shows
the country-level results and Panel II shows the pooled results. We plot the securities market
line (SML) for n-days (dashed green line) and a-days (solid red line). Although the average
world market excess return was positive on n-days (4.1 bps), in both panels the SML on n-days
is downward-sloping and the intercepts are positive, contrary to what the CAPM predicts.
For the country-level aggregated portfolios, the intercept is 10.5 bps (t-statistic = 9.51) and
the slope is -8.1 (t-statistic = -5.61). For pooled portfolios, the intercept is 7.7 bps (t-statistic
= 9.48) and the slope is -1.56 (t-statistic = -1.71).
[FIGURE B.1 ABOUT HERE.]
By contrast, Chart A shows that on FOMC a-days the SML is strongly upward-sloping
in both panels, with a slope of 39.5 bps (t-statistic = 8.31) for country-level aggregated
portfolios and 26.6 bps (t-statistic = 5.90) for pooled portfolios. The positive implied market
risk premium on a-days, together with very high R2s of 88.3% and 79.0%, is consistent with
the hypothesis that stock returns follow the World CAPM on such days. The SML slope on
a-days for pooled portfolios almost perfectly fits their average excess returns, indicating that
the CAPM ”works” extremely well. For country-level portfolios, the intercept is 0.9 bps and
is not statistically different from zero (t-statistic = 0.25), while it is 7.9 bps (t-statistic =
1.96) for pooled portfolios. The positive intercept for pooled portfolios is the only result not
supporting the CAPM on FOMC a-days.2
Charts B, C, and D repeat this analysis for the BoE, BoJ, and ECB, respectively. Clearly,
in contrast to FOMC a-days, the world CAPM does not help explain the cross-section of
returns on a-days of non-U.S. central banks. The highest R2 is 38.9% (for country-level
1Table B.1 reports the betas and portfolio shares for our test portfolios. The betas resulting from the
two different approaches are not very different across the ten portfolios, even though the composition of the
portfolios often is.
2These findings remain the same over the longer 1978-2016 FOMC sample. They are also not driven by
higher volatility on FOMC a-days, as the relation between beta and average returns is actually negative on
large-move (those with absolute excess returns in the top decile) days.
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portfolios on BoJ a-days), but is generally much lower. Furthermore, intercepts are mostly
different from zero, while the SML slopes are typically different from the world market port-
folio excess return on the corresponding announcement day. These results provide further
evidence that the Fed is unique and different from other central banks in its impact on equity
markets.
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Table B.1
World CAPM-Beta Sorted Portfolios: Average Betas and Average Portfolio Shares
This table reports average betas (Panel I) and average portfolio shares (Panel II) for ten value-weighted World
CAPM beta-sorted portfolios consisting of stocks from four countries (Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom,
and the United States). World market betas are estimated using rolling windows of 250 trading days. Stocks
are sorted into ten portfolios - from low (Portfolio 1) to high (Portfolio 10) - according to their estimated
betas. Portfolios in Panel a (Panel b) are constructed by sorting and value-weighting stocks at country-level
(by pooling and value-weighting all stocks, regardless of the country origin). U.S. stock returns are from the
CRSP database. Non-U.S. stock returns are from the Worldscope database (Datastream) and are converted
into U.S. dollars using spot rates from Thomson-Reuters. The sample period is January 1998 to December
2016.
Country
Portfolios
Low 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 High
Panel I: Average betas
a) Country-Level:
United States -0.12 0.24 0.45 0.62 0.78 0.92 1.08 1.28 1.56 2.20
United Kingdom -0.03 0.19 0.28 0.36 0.46 0.56 0.69 0.84 1.04 1.56
Japan -0.15 0.06 0.16 0.25 0.34 0.43 0.53 0.63 0.78 1.09
Germany -0.27 0.11 0.22 0.32 0.44 0.57 0.74 0.95 1.24 1.84
b) Pooling:
All -0.19 0.10 0.25 0.39 0.53 0.68 0.85 1.04 1.31 1.95
Panel II: Portfolio share (%)
a) Country-Level:
United States 55.08 55.06 55.03 55.10 55.11 55.19 55.13 55.10 55.02 54.99
United Kingdom 9.83 9.80 9.78 9.75 9.75 9.72 9.75 9.77 9.81 9.84
Japan 28.75 28.83 28.88 28.86 28.83 28.82 28.82 28.82 28.82 28.80
Germany 6.35 6.31 6.31 6.29 6.30 6.27 6.30 6.31 6.34 6.37
b) Pooling:
United States 38.09 36.98 35.73 38.63 45.74 56.62 66.38 73.31 77.85 82.99
United Kingdom 7.29 10.99 12.99 13.51 12.74 11.00 9.37 7.74 6.58 5.28
Japan 46.78 45.75 44.60 40.71 34.18 25.82 18.80 14.12 10.31 5.93
Germany 7.83 6.27 6.68 7.15 7.34 6.55 5.46 4.83 5.26 5.80
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C Additional Evidence on Announcement Premia
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Table C.1
Breakdown of Two-Day Average Excess Returns Around Major Scheduled Monetary Policy Meetings
This table decomposes two-day average excess returns around major central bank announcement days (a-days) into one-day average excess returns (a-day1
and a-day2, respectively). Announcement days are the calendar days when interest rate decisions taken by the Federal Reserve (Panel I), the Bank of England
(BoE, Panel II), the Bank of Japan (BoJ, Panel III), and the European Central Bank (ECB, Panel IV) are scheduled for release. Two-day windows are defined
in Table A.2. The last column of each panel recovers the two-day average excess return as defined in the main text. Excess returns are expressed in basis
points. Countries are grouped into four geographical areas. t-statistics are in square brackets. Test assets are Datastream Global Equity indices denominated
in U.S. dollars. The sample period is January 1998 (January 1999 for ECB) to December 2016.
Country
I: FOMC II: BoE III: BoJ IV: ECB
a-day1 a-day2 Two-day a-day1 a-day2 Two-day a-day1 a-day2 Two-day a-day1 a-day2 Two-day
A: Europe
Austria 29.47 15.91 45.38 2.19 6.79 8.99 9.68 -4.03 5.65 4.98 -0.55 4.43
[2.95] [1.11] [0.26] [0.70] [1.17] [-0.51] [0.65] [-0.06]
Belgium 29.88 5.34 35.22 0.44 5.13 5.57 3.82 8.24 12.06 18.61 1.60 20.21
[2.64] [0.40] [0.05] [0.52] [0.47] [1.03] [2.42] [0.17]
Denmark 39.12 14.54 53.66 -7.34 -5.64 -12.98 6.03 1.10 7.13 10.87 2.47 13.34
[3.30] [1.10] [-0.89] [-0.60] [0.67] [0.14] [1.32] [0.27]
Finland 56.26 2.71 58.97 -17.69 9.14 -8.55 35.92 5.90 41.82 0.82 26.04 26.85
[4.32] [0.15] [-1.57] [0.62] [3.09] [0.54] [0.06] [1.49]
France 49.04 -3.59 45.44 -8.40 -1.73 -10.13 9.80 3.17 12.97 6.35 -5.72 0.63
[4.22] [-0.25] [-0.97] [-0.16] [1.08] [0.40] [0.76] [-0.55]
Germany 36.71 -0.44 36.28 -3.42 -4.97 -8.39 15.65 1.28 16.93 7.36 -5.30 2.06
[4.05] [-0.03] [-0.40] [-0.49] [1.77] [0.15] [0.88] [-0.53]
Greece 13.18 27.62 40.80 5.96 1.85 7.81 3.79 19.38 23.17 -5.49 6.47 0.98
[0.70] [1.63] [0.44] [0.13] [0.29] [1.62] [-0.41] [0.52]
Ireland 35.45 13.54 49.00 0.09 4.62 4.71 6.44 9.98 16.42 5.84 5.38 11.22
[2.61] [0.90] [0.01] [0.44] [0.70] [1.06] [0.62] [0.56]
Italy 45.18 -1.25 43.93 -5.05 0.63 -4.42 3.85 5.61 9.46 12.19 -7.04 5.15
[3.62] [-0.08] [-0.54] [0.05] [0.40] [0.65] [1.41] [-0.66]
Netherlands 39.12 5.27 44.39 -8.76 -1.57 -10.33 6.29 2.82 9.12 8.51 -7.91 0.60
[3.59] [0.39] [-1.07] [-0.15] [0.69] [0.36] [1.10] [-0.80]
Norway 27.08 13.13 40.21 -7.39 -4.12 -11.51 7.03 3.35 10.38 4.34 -1.38 2.96
[2.00] [0.71] [-0.66] [-0.32] [0.61] [0.35] [0.39] [-0.11]
Poland 28.57 13.82 42.39 -18.48 4.68 -13.80 3.76 10.37 14.13 -1.20 22.23 21.03
[1.80] [0.78] [-1.61] [0.35] [0.30] [0.99] [-0.12] [1.71]
Portugal 29.47 1.17 30.64 -2.53 12.78 10.25 -2.28 12.77 10.49 -1.11 -0.08 -1.19
[2.66] [0.08] [-0.28] [1.23] [-0.26] [1.67] [-0.13] [-0.01]
Spain 46.56 -9.08 37.48 -6.85 0.30 -6.55 17.15 0.58 17.73 10.13 -1.05 9.09
[4.03] [-0.59] [-0.76] [0.02] [1.91] [0.07] [1.17] [-0.10]
Sweden 63.82 -0.66 63.15 -7.48 -9.75 -17.23 22.59 -0.74 21.85 1.24 0.95 2.18
[4.75] [-0.04] [-0.65] [-0.74] [2.05] [-0.07] [0.10] [0.08]
Switzerland 29.14 11.24 40.38 -1.34 -7.55 -8.89 5.30 -1.60 3.70 8.47 -0.69 7.78
[3.24] [1.01] [-0.20] [-0.99] [0.72] [-0.24] [1.46] [-0.09]
United Kingdom 40.10 4.39 44.49 -8.26 -0.46 -8.72 6.72 3.03 9.75 3.47 2.20 5.67
[3.34] [0.35] [-1.03] [-0.05] [0.80] [0.44] [0.46] [0.25]
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[continued]
Country
I: FOMC II: BoE III: BoJ IV: ECB
a-day1 a-day2 Two-day a-day1 a-day2 Two-day a-day1 a-day2 Two-day a-day1 a-day2 Two-day
B: North America
Canada 9.01 35.31 44.33 -6.15 3.20 -2.95 0.30 11.82 12.12 6.89 3.71 10.60
[0.85] [3.16] [-0.80] [0.39] [0.03] [1.60] [0.86] [0.44]
United States 13.57 34.84 48.41 -2.72 -0.23 -2.95 2.60 1.72 4.32 9.75 0.16 9.91
[1.14] [3.51] [-0.37] [-0.03] [0.34] [0.23] [1.26] [0.02]
C: Asia Pacific
Australia 16.40 23.80 40.19 12.46 -10.26 2.21 17.98 4.49 22.47 14.71 6.06 20.77
[1.47] [1.68] [1.33] [-1.18] [2.19] [0.49] [1.65] [0.69]
Hong Kong 6.92 20.20 27.12 -8.24 5.99 -2.25 4.57 6.34 10.91 11.23 17.71 28.94
[0.72] [1.54] [-0.86] [0.65] [0.54] [0.70] [1.19] [1.88]
Japan 4.86 35.54 40.40 -5.24 -14.00 -19.24 9.46 -1.75 7.71 2.49 0.89 3.38
[0.42] [2.46] [-0.56] [-1.94] [1.08] [-0.20] [0.27] [0.10]
New Zealand 14.86 12.07 26.93 9.92 -2.97 6.95 22.46 8.75 31.21 6.82 11.27 18.09
[1.48] [0.95] [1.29] [-0.42] [3.32] [1.27] [0.98] [1.44]
Singapore 24.84 15.97 40.81 7.69 4.70 12.39 14.39 6.34 20.74 7.75 10.09 17.84
[2.75] [1.30] [0.89] [0.67] [2.07] [0.85] [0.97] [1.48]
D: Emerging
Argentina 0.71 23.88 24.60 6.55 -2.82 3.73 -6.70 -0.32 -7.03 4.15 -1.04 4.15
[0.05] [1.84] [0.67] [-0.23] [-0.47] [-0.03] [0.40] [-0.11]
Brazil -6.90 49.75 42.85 -21.51 15.32 -6.19 21.72 2.05 23.77 9.81 17.53 9.81
[-0.34] [3.36] [-1.76] [1.08] [1.69] [0.17] [0.70] [1.34]
Chile -9.39 12.60 3.21 -2.52 16.27 13.75 0.54 6.27 6.80 6.51 17.53 24.04
[-0.99] [1.41] [-0.36] [2.00] [0.07] [0.95] [1.01] [2.43]
China 7.02 5.25 12.28 -5.19 7.63 2.44 7.96 10.81 18.77 6.05 29.57 35.62
[0.53] [0.29] [-0.42] [0.72] [0.72] [0.90] [0.55] [2.72]
Indonesia 10.88 66.36 77.23 12.94 22.54 35.48 31.51 6.30 37.81 17.93 26.02 43.95
[0.82] [3.41] [0.62] [1.84] [2.14] [0.43] [1.42] [2.29]
Malaysia 3.72 46.90 50.63 3.19 3.83 7.02 11.26 -9.47 1.80 8.07 6.25 14.31
[0.47] [3.16] [0.40] [0.51] [0.81] [-1.12] [1.24] [1.03]
Mexico 5.38 35.33 40.71 -14.45 -2.04 -16.49 13.51 -9.59 3.92 19.92 8.15 28.06
[0.44] [3.35] [-1.55] [-0.19] [1.40] [-1.04] [2.03] [0.82]
Philippines 8.76 41.25 50.01 6.56 8.66 15.22 8.93 5.82 14.75 6.44 20.89 27.34
[0.91] [3.46] [0.74] [1.02] [0.98] [0.57] [0.81] [2.37]
South Africa 31.49 36.67 68.15 -9.94 3.45 -6.49 6.92 7.35 14.26 -7.26 1.58 -5.68
[2.31] [2.01] [-0.89] [0.27] [0.62] [0.79] [-0.69] [0.14]
South Korea 30.01 57.11 87.11 1.48 5.06 6.54 13.34 5.49 18.83 -5.87 4.68 -1.19
[1.86] [2.37] [0.09] [0.38] [1.10] [0.42] [-0.39] [0.36]
Taiwan 18.43 22.07 40.51 -2.77 2.75 -0.02 -2.58 -7.14 -9.73 -0.24 20.87 20.63
[1.60] [1.46] [-0.26] [0.32] [-0.28] [-0.72] [-0.02] [2.13]
Thailand -3.81 26.94 23.13 21.70 11.16 32.86 17.87 10.40 28.27 5.02 7.70 12.73
[-0.25] [1.70] [1.87] [1.14] [1.36] [0.83] [0.44] [0.78]
Turkey 57.67 42.96 100.62 -25.34 9.96 -15.38 25.38 -2.00 23.38 36.45 14.96 51.41
[2.85] [1.68] [-1.46] [0.51] [1.51] [-0.13] [2.03] [0.72]
Venezuela 4.23 2.31 6.53 8.38 7.61 15.99 -8.82 21.73 12.92 1.57 5.42 6.99
[0.25] [0.17] [0.51] [0.51] [-0.58] [1.75] [0.15] [0.40]
Figure C.1
Breakdown of Two-Day Excess Returns Around Major Central Bank a-days
This chart decomposes two-day average excess returns around major central bank announcement days into
average domestic excess returns earned on the day prior to the announcement (green bar) and average domestic
excess returns earned on the announcement day (a-day, yellow bar). The a-day is the calendar day when interest
rate decisions taken by the Federal Reserve (FOMC), the Bank of England (BoE), the European Central Bank
(ECB), and the Bank of Japan (BoJ) are scheduled for release in the United States, the United Kingdom,
Germany, and Japan, respectively. Excess returns are expressed in basis points. Error bars are 95% confidence
intervals. Test assets are Datastream Global Equity indices denominated in U.S. dollars. The sample period
is January 1998 (January 1999 for ECB) to December 2016.
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Table C.2
Announcement Premia Across Countries: FOMC (1978-2016)
This table reports average two-day excess returns (µ, in basis points) on announcement days (a-days), the
number of a-days in each sample (Na), and the average two-day excess return difference between announcement
and non-announcement days (µa-µn) for 38 global markets. Announcement days are those trading days when
FOMC interest rate decisions are scheduled for release. Non-announcement days are those trading days with
no announcements by any major central bank. a-day returns are computed over a two-day window spanning
the FOMC meeting day and either the following or the previous trading day (see Table A.2 for details). Equity
series are Datastream Global Country total return indices. The daily risk-free rate is obtained from Kenneth
French’s website. Returns are denominated in U.S. dollars. The sample period is January 1978 to December
2016, but data coverage varies across countries. Countries are grouped into four geographical areas. t-statistics
are in square brackets.
Country µa Na µa-µn Country µa Na µa-µn
A: Europe C: Asia-Pacific
Austria 29.48 321 25.47 Australia 21.61 321 15.84
[2.59] [2.16] [1.92] [1.35]
Belgium 26.14 321 20.92 Hong Kong 30.31 321 23.28
[2.54] [1.97] [2.49] [1.82]
Denmark 34.95 321 27.89 Japan 30.52 321 27.21
[3.20] [2.47] [2.83] [2.43]
Finland 47.69 231 48.39 New Zealand 29.21 232 28.81
[2.81] [2.80] [2.20] [2.13]
France 32.78 321 25.48 Singapore 31.04 321 28.07
[2.86] [2.14] [3.00] [2.59]
Germany 29.48 321 25.50 D: Emerging
[2.90] [2.41] Argentina 32.77 188 32.48
Greece 33.44 216 36.31 [1.73] [1.69]
[1.61] [1.71] Brazil 49.64 181 50.07
Ireland 22.85 321 16.96 [2.00] [2.00]
[1.73] [1.25] Chile 15.10 221 11.91
Italy 57.55 321 54.29 [1.28] [0.99]
[4.33] [3.95] China 10.26 188 9.43
Netherlands 37.74 321 31.67 [0.49] [0.45]
[3.65] [2.96] Indonesia 68.88 214 73.76
Norway 17.51 299 10.61 [3.47] [3.61]
[1.18] [0.69] Malaysia 45.86 248 43.44
Poland 27.35 183 30.81 [3.59] [3.30]
[1.18] [1.31] Mexico 69.89 222 67.26
Portugal 24.67 216 27.04 [4.01] [3.80]
[1.66] [1.80] Philippines 47.67 225 49.30
Spain 36.27 239 34.92 [3.33] [3.36]
[2.36] [2.23] South Africa 39.52 321 32.34
Sweden 41.44 280 35.37 [2.73] [2.16]
[2.69] [2.24] South Korea 76.45 235 77.53
Switzerland 26.59 321 20.87 [3.66] [3.64]
[2.97] [2.25] Taiwan 3.67 230 3.16
United Kingdom 36.68 321 31.49 [0.21] [0.18]
[3.51] [2.91] Thailand 25.24 240 21.53
B: North America [1.42] [1.19]
Canada 28.27 321 24.40 Turkey 62.77 221 59.91
[3.11] [2.58] [2.32] [2.17]
United States 35.73 321 31.22 Venezuela 7.20 216 -3.13
[4.43] [3.70] [0.32] [-0.13]
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Table C.3
FOMC Announcement Premia and CAPM Alphas for Global Banks
This table shows average two-day excess returns (µ, in basis points) on FOMC announcement days (a-days) for
major international banks (µa), as well as the average difference between realized returns and returns predicted
by the (domestic) CAPM (αa). Column 2 defines the domestic market for each bank. Column 5 reports the
average two-day excess return around FOMC days for the domestic stock market (µaMkt). a-day returns are
computed over a two-day window spanning the FOMC meeting day and either the following or the previous
trading day (see Table A.2 for details). International banks are ranked by market capitalization as of the end
of 2016. The full ranking and details are available at www.relbanks.com. Returns are from Datastream and
are converted into U.S. dollars. The sample period is January 1998 to December 2016. t-statistics (t-stat) are
in brackets.
Bank Country µa t-stat µaMkt α
a t-stat
JPMorgan Chase USA 92.78 [3.43] 44.78 19.96 [1.09]
Wells Fargo USA 101.30 [2.96] 44.78 39.56 [1.34]
Bank of America USA 57.50 [1.78] 44.78 -16.42 [-0.62]
HSBC Holdings U.K. 47.71 [1.98] 40.86 -2.98 [-0.22]
Citigroup USA 78.69 [2.21] 44.78 -3.63 [-0.14]
Commonwealth Bank Australia 39.76 [1.70] 36.56 -2.76 [-0.19]
Royal Bank of Canada Canada 51.50 [2.74] 40.70 8.61 [0.67]
Goldman Sachs USA 90.53 [3.06] 41.38 19.80 [0.97]
Toronto Dominion Bank Canada 60.63 [3.16] 40.70 16.45 [1.08]
Mitsubishi UFJ Japan 66.39 [2.32] 38.47 9.29 [0.54]
BNP Paribas France 96.49 [2.77] 41.81 29.34 [1.18]
Banco Santander Spain 34.00 [1.08] 33.84 -16.89 [-1.29]
Morgan Stanley USA 76.55 [2.02] 44.78 -26.33 [-0.97]
Westpac Australia 43.33 [1.89] 36.56 1.09 [0.07]
Itau Unibanco Brazil 33.56 [1.11] 39.22 -16.90 [-0.87]
Bank of Nova Scotia Canada 54.83 [2.74] 40.70 10.64 [0.74]
UBS Switzerland 45.65 [1.27] 36.74 -13.58 [-0.58]
Australia and New
Zealand Banking Group Australia 27.33 [1.18] 36.56 -16.59 [-1.16]
National Australia Bank Australia 47.25 [1.80] 36.56 5.44 [0.33]
Lloyds Banking Group U.K. 104.55 [2.39] 40.86 36.70 [1.03]
Banco Bradesco Brazil 53.90 [1.37] 39.22 -0.46 [-0.02]
Sumitomo Mitsui Group Japan 75.56 [2.25] 36.77 21.82 [0.88]
Bank of Montreal Canada 54.26 [2.80] 40.70 14.66 [1.01]
Barclays U.K. 74.60 [1.97] 40.86 -3.11 [-0.12]
Nordea Bank Sweden 61.55 [1.85] 59.52 -5.17 [-0.24]
Bank of NY Mellon USA 76.18 [2.46] 44.78 12.59 [0.61]
Mizuho Financial Group Japan 60.39 [1.64] 37.62 -2.28 [-0.08]
Societe Generale France 53.20 [1.46] 38.24 -8.73 [-0.37]
Intesa Sanpaolo Italy 40.05 [1.07] 40.30 -22.90 [-1.10]
Canadian Imperial
Bank of Commerce Canada 94.18 [4.41] 40.70 50.00 [3.49]
Credit Suisse Group Switzerland 60.27 [1.95] 36.74 -2.10 [-0.10]
Standard Chartered U.K. 129.07 [3.25] 40.86 61.62 [2.45]
Deutsche Bank Germany 64.21 [1.92] 32.64 20.66 [0.72]
Unicredit Italy 51.14 [1.29] 40.30 -10.25 [-0.46]
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